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Legal Dispute Bargaining, or Why We Can’t All Just Get Along2
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Robert J. Condlin*
Introduction
The communitarian3 conception of bargaining now popular with legal academics
presupposes a world in which people are always at their best. Clients and lawyers share
information about themselves and their situations candidly and honestly, construct agreements
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Work on this article was supported by a grant from the
UM Foundation. Participants in the University of Maryland Law School Faculty Workshop made many helpful
comments on an earlier draft and Charles Sullivan, David Bogen, Gerald Wetlaufer and James Stark made
particularly helpful suggestions. Susan McCarty and Eric Sherbine turned an unmanageable mish-mash of note
material into coherent and even proper text. My thanks to all of them.
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Apologies to Professor Alshuler. See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of
Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1986).
2
Apologies here to Rodney King and the twenty-six million or so others whom Google indicates have used
or repeated one or another version of this question/expression. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Why We Can’t All Just Get
Along, 60 FIRST THINGS 18 (1996) (describing the impossibility of a union of religiosity and rationalism).
3

I use “communitarian” to make the link with the social and political theory that “began in the upper
reaches of Anglo-American academia in the form of a critical reaction to John Rawls' landmark 1971 book A Theory
of Justice [and draws] primarily upon the insights of Aristotle and Hegel . . . [to] dispute Rawls' assumption that the
principal task of government is to secure and distribute fairly the liberties and economic resources individuals need
to lead freely chosen lives. [The theory is grounded on] . . . methodological claims about the importance of tradition
and social context for moral and political reasoning, ontological or metaphysical claims about the social nature of
the self, and normative claims about the value of community.” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism
(last visited January 24, 2006). See generally DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS (1993); AMITAI
ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993);
ROBERT NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY (1953); ROBERT N. BELLAH et al., HABITS OF THE HEART:
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985); ROBERT N. BELLAH AND & STEVEN M. et al., THE
GOOD SOCIETY (1991); and DEREK L. PHILLIPS, LOOKING BACKWARD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
COMMUNITARIAN THOUGHT (1993). In legal scholarship the theory often is discussed under the rubric of civic
republicanism. See generally Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Frank I. Michelman,
The Supreme Court, 1985 Term -- Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); and Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). But see Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic
Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1993); Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism:
Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2003). The legal bargaining
literature variously refers to the theory as “collectivist,” see Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in
Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 753 (2004), “cooperative,” “integrative,” “coordinative,” “collaborative” and the
like. See James K.L. Lawrence, Collaborative Lawyering: A New Development in Conflict Resolution, 17 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 431 (2002) (describing the self-styled “collaborative law” movement); Pauline H. Tesler,
Collaborative Law: A New Approach to Family Law ADR, 2 CONFLICT MGMT. 12 (1996) (same). A communitarian
approach to bargaining is characterized principally by a commitment to resolving disputes from the perspective of
what is good for the social group, on the basis of consensus norms, rather than from the perspective of what is good
for the individual bargainer, on the basis of rights claims. Some have suggested to me that it is unfair to blame
communitarian political theory generally for the sins of its poor legal bargaining relation, and in a way that is true,
but the legal bargaining theory I will discuss sees itself as communitarian, see Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory
of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L. J. 1789, 1821 (2000) (describing negotiator motives as either “communitarian or
individualistic”), and it is hard to find a better word to describe it. If you want, think of it as communitarianism lite.
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from the perspective of their common interests and resolve differences according to objectively
derived and jointly agreed upon substantive standards. They “connect”4 as persons and in the
process convert what in lesser hands might be a form of stylized combat into a kind of joint
venture,5 and sometimes even a lasting friendship.6 This, in turn, takes the hard edge off their
disputing7 and makes it less antagonistic, less competitive, less deceptive, less manipulative and
less mean-spirited than it otherwise might be. One might even say that communitarian
bargainers create a kind of dispute-settlement Nirvana (or Eden),8 where self-interest is not
4

Leonard R. Riskin, The Comtemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of Mindfulness
Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2002) (describing how
applying the techniques of mindfulness meditation in negotiation will help a lawyer develop “a sense of . . .
connection with other people”); Deborah M. Kolb & Linda L. Putnam, “La négociation: une question de genre?” 2
NEGOCIATON 59 (2004), reprinted in CHARLES B. WIGGINS & L. RANDOLPH LOWRY, NEGOTIATION AND
SETTLEMENT ADVOCACY: A BOOK OF READINGS 468, 472-74 (2d ed.) (2005) (describing the concept of
connectedness in negotiation through the lens of gender).
5
John Stuart Mill’s description of his working relationship with Harriet Taylor captures the particular
understanding of joint venture I have in mind:
When two persons have their thoughts and speculations completely in common; when all subjects
of intellectual or moral interest are discussed between them in daily life . . . when they set out from
the same principles, and arrive at their conclusions by processes pursued jointly, it is of little
consequence in respect to the question of originality, which of them holds the pen . . . .
JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 183-84 (Penguin Classics 1989) (1873). For an interpretive example, see W.
Bradley Wendell, The Jurisprudence of Enron: Professionalism as Interpretation, http://ssrn.com/abstract=579122
(last visited January 5, 2006) (“Interpretation is not a function of a single judicial mind, acting alone. Rather, it is a
community-bound enterprise, in which the criteria for reasonable exercise of judgment are elaborated
intersubjectively, among an interpretive community that is constituted by fidelity to law.”)
6
See e.g., ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 7 (1991) (“Many people recognize the high costs of hard positional bargaining . . . [and] . . .
hope to avoid them by following a more gentle style of negotiation. Instead of seeing the other side as adversaries,
they prefer to see them as friends.”). On the nature of friendship, see Robert J. Condlin, “What’s Love Got To Do
With It?” “It’s Not Like They’re Your Friends For Christ’s Sake”: The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer
and Client, 82 NEB. L. REV. 211, 250-70 (2004).
7
Throughout this article I will limit my discussion to dispute-bargaining. Transactional bargaining is
different in several significant respects. See Robert J. Condlin, Cases on Both Sides: Patterns of Argument in Legal
Dispute-Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REV. 65, 65 n.1 (1985) (describing the differences between “dispute negotiation”
and “rulemaking negotiation”).
8
Some claim “transformative” powers for communitarian bargaining, seeing it as a means of moral rebirth
and growth for its participants. See e.g., ROBERT BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994). Professors BaruchBush and Folger discuss mediation but since mediation is just another form of multi-party bargaining, as this
article’s discussion will show, their claim also would seem to apply to pure bargaining. For elaborations on the
claim, see Jeffrey R. Seul, How Transformative is Transformative Mediation?: A Constructive-Developmental
Assessment, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 135 (1999); Bruce Winick & David Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic 3 (“lawyers thus inevitably
are therapeutic agents. Once this insight is absorbed, it is transformative.”) http://ssrn.com/abstract=199142;
Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999) (describing how the
communitarian move of apologizing in negotiation “may . . . offer paths for spiritual and psychological growth”).
Much of the feminist literature on legal bargaining makes a similar claim. See e.g.,Kolb & Putnam, supra note 4, at
472-74 (describing the relationship among “Gender, interdependence, and the possibilities for transformative
outcomes.”) Professors Shaffer and Cochran defend a large scale version of the claim grounded in religious
doctrine, though they see transformation as an experience visited by lawyers upon clients for the clients’ own good.
This “lawyer as savior” perspective has always been around and may be increasing in popularity. See e.g., Kristin
Huston, The Lawyer as Savior: What Literature Says About the Attorney’s Role in Redemption, 73 UMKC L. REV.
161, 163 (2004) (synopsizing the “salvation stories” of three of the usual suspects – Finch, Bartleby and Portia – as

2

naked, force is not brutish, entitlement claims are not legalistic and everyone acts in the spirit
and to the limits, of their social potential. This is a wonderfully inspiring story, full of nobility
and grandeur and it would be a source of great comfort in an unfriendly and fractious world if it
was true.9 But sadly, the assumptions communitarian bargaining theory makes about legal
disputing are too idealized to serve as a guide to real-life bargaining most of the time and its
foundational dogma, that bargaining distributions are natural, self-evident and complementary,10
depicting lawyers as “a special kind of savior – able to protect, inform and aid in ways and at times when no one
else can,” and suggesting that this image “instructs lawyers in the varying paths to be traveled” in life and “gives
great meaning” to various lawyer roles.). For a critical discussion, see Condlin, supra note 6, at 280-95. Scott
Peppet proposes that lawyers construct their own bargaining rules on the ground that such a process would
“facilitate[e] the moral development of [the legal profession].” See Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers’ Bargaining Ethics,
Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90
IOWA L. REV. 475, 516 (2005). And Professor Menkel-Meadow seems to believe that communitarian methods are
the answer to the problems with “deliberative democracy.” See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in
Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347 (2005). While different in obvious respects, one might paraphrase the
common theme in these arguments as: “Communitarian bargaining, like Freud and Jesus, can save you from your
sins.” In its own way, each of these proposals ignores the familiar dictum of not letting the perfect be the enemy of
the good. For a discussion of the Nirvana fallacy, see Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social
Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1230 n.33 (1994).
9
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation in Popular Culture: What Are We Bargaining For?, in LAW
AND POPULAR CULTURE 583, 584 (Michael Freeman ed., 2005) (“[analogies to] competitive sports or war-like
struggles . . . no longer represent either the growing scholarship on effective, efficient and more just negotiation
practices or the evolving practice of legal negotiation in the real world”). Professor Menkel-Meadow reads the
“growing scholarship” on negotiation selectively, one might even say adversarially, to reach the conclusion that the
communitarian model now predominates in the profession as well as in the academy. This is anomalous, not just
because she spends much of her article berating lawyers for failing to adopt the more “evolved” communitarian
view, suggesting that the model hasn’t quite taken over the world of actual practice after all (see Milton Heumann &
Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement Methods in New Jersey: “You Can’t Always
Get What You Want,” 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 253, 255 (1997) (finding that seventy-one percent of
attorneys adopt a positional or hard bargaining strategy)), but also because one would expect a proponent of
communitarian methods to approach bargaining scholarship in a slightly less adversarial spirit. Unfortunately,
communitarians do not always follow their own espoused theory. This should not surprise us. Chris Argyris, one of
the leading scholars in the study of the relationship between what he termed “espoused theory” and “theory-in-use”
commonly used to remark that of all the different social groups he studied, academics were the ones least bothered,
or motivated, by cognitive dissonance. See CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD A. SCHÖN, THEORY IN PRACTICE:
INCREASING PROFESSIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 6-12 (1974) (describing the difference between espoused theory and
theory in use).
10
See e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything: The Lawyer as Problem-Solver, 28
HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 915 (2000) (describing the “important observation of social psychologist George Homans . . .
[that] people often have complimentary interests . . . and do not always value things exactly the same (sic) way,”
using the familiar icing/cake example as an illustration); Max H. Bazerman, Negotiator Judgment: A Critical Look
at the Rationality Assumption, 27 AM. BEH. SCI. 211 (1985) (criticizing the “mythical fixed-pie assumption” of
distributive bargaining and implying that integrative trade-offs between bargainer interests are always preferable and
available). This dogma may be true for disputes between what Anthony Appiah calls “constitutionally antagonistic
groups,” though even these groups sometimes want what the adversary wants simply because the adversary wants it.
For a thoughtful discussion, see Kwame Anthony Appiah, Negation as Affirmation, in THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY
138-41 (2005). Communitarian bargaining theorists seem to assume a Jack Sprat world in which all bargainers,
fortuitously, are paired with their constitutionally antagonistic opposites. The related phenomenon, of rejecting what
adversaries want simply because they want it, is described in the negotiation literature as “reactive devaluation.”
For representative discussions, see Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining
Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795 (2004) (“a proposal can look less desirable than it otherwise would merely because a
counterpart offered it”); Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in KENNETH J. ARROW,
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 34-40 (1995) (“Several theories of psychological consistency hold that any

3

is based on a vision of humans before the fall. The communitarian view is more mythic than
data-based, appealing mostly to those who have little direct experience with bargaining practice
itself, those who have never entered the fray so to speak, or what’s worse, have entered it, done
badly and now want to change the ground rules so they will do better in the future.11
Most lawyers recognize the limitations of the communitarian view of bargaining and
successfully resist its pull, clinging to various forms of old-fashioned, win-lose, aggressive,
bottom-line methods.12 Academics tend to see this as a failure to recognize one’s own best
interests, another example of “what’s the matter with Kansas,”13 but in fact it may indicate that
lawyers understand something about real-life bargaining that legal academics do not. They
understand that legal disputes are about real, not just perceived, conflicts and that the often
relevant object of judgment . . . will be evaluated more negatively as a consequence of its linkage to a negative
source.”).
11
See Peppet, supra note 8, at 516, 531 (describing how some lawyers do not “relish” the standard
adversarial conception of lawyer bargaining role and would like to change it to create a work environment that is
more personally compatible). Another strategy is to change the description of the bargaining universe on which
theory operates. Descriptions of bargaining practice in much of the academic literature are so airily ethereal, thin, or
fanciful, that real life bargainers often would not recognize them as descriptions of bargaining. It’s as if academic
commentators reconstitute the world to fit their analytical categories rather than the other way around. It brings to
mind an aphorism attributed to Abraham Maslow (and no doubt many others), that if you give a kid a hammer soon
he will discover that everything in the world needs pounding.
12
Milton Huemann and Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement Methods in
New Jersey: “You Can’t Always Get What You Want,” 12 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 253, 262-65 (1997) (lawyers
describing why they continue to use adversarial bargaining methods). The issue is complicated by the fact that
professional ethics norms require lawyers to provide loyal and diligent client representation and sometimes this is
possible only through the use of non-communitarian methods. I discuss this point at length in Robert J. Condlin,
Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1, 78-86
(1992).
13
See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?: HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF
AMERICA (2004). Professor Fisher’s “clarification of areas of disagreement [with]” rather than “response to”
Professor James White is a good example of this attitude in operation. As Fisher sees it, “White is more concerned
with the way the world is, and I [Fisher] am more concerned with what intelligent people ought to do . . . . I want a
student to negotiate better than his or her father.” Roger Fisher, Comment, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 120 (1984).
(Professor Fisher presumably used the “his/her” pronoun construction to avoid sexist phraseology but, if
alphabetical order is the default sequencing rule, the decision to place the male pronoun first is an instance of
considered rather than habitual sexism. It also makes the sentence more cumbersome. In Professor Fisher’s (and
others’) hands, this familiar linguistic gesture is an example of that oft-alleged but, in reality, rare phenomenon of a
“politically correct”—in the pejorative sense—response. Also, why just fathers? Mothers never negotiate? See
e.g., LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE 12 (2003)
(“I negotiate with my kids all the time,” quoting women subjects in the study)). One could feel sorry for Professor
White. He may be the most under-appreciated figure in modern legal bargaining scholarship. His review of Fisher
and Ury’s Getting to Yes, for example, contains one of the most sophisticated and realistic descriptions of legal
bargaining anywhere in the literature. See James J. White, The Pros and Cons of “Getting to YES,” 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 115 (1984) (reviewing ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 11-12 (1981)). See also James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying
in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926 [hereinafter Machiavelli]; James Freund, Bridging Troubled
Waters: Negotiating Disputes, 1985-86 LITIGATION 43-46. Yet his views are routinely caricatured and vilified by
proponents of communitarian methods, principally for not anticipating the communitarian ascendance. He deserves
much better. His writing has more to teach modern bargainers than most of the communitarian panegyrics
combined. He and Judge Edwards had the first major negotiation course book and almost the first one altogether.
See HARRY T. EDWARDS & JAMES J. WHITE, THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR (1977); CORNELIUS J. PECK, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON NEGOTIATION (1972).
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legitimate feelings of entitlement, disappointment and anger they evoke make bargaining stakes
worth fighting over.14 Bargaining theory at its best, communitarian theory included, informs
bargaining practice, but it also must be tested against it15 and it is in this latter regard that
communitarian theory frequently falls short. There is room for communitarian maneuvering in
legal bargaining, of course. Bargaining is a complex social phenomenon in which the need to
trust co-exists with the need to deceive, influence and trade (“create” and “claim” in Lax and
Sebennius’ felicitous terms),16 but an exclusively, relentlessly, or unqualifiedly communitarian
approach to bargaining is another name for eleemosynary behavior and lawyers usually want to
make deals rather than gifts.
I will illustrate the objections to the communitarian conception of bargaining by
analyzing the behavior of a set of lawyers conducting a pre-trial settlement conference in a
hypothetical Title VII employment discrimination lawsuit.17 I choose a story about bargaining to
present my argument not because of any strong belief in the efficacy of story-telling as an
empirical method,18 but because a story shows most graphically how the communitarian
14

Describing lessons learned from his father, John Stuart Mill once explained why this is so:
Those, who having opinions which they hold to be immensely important, and their contraries to be
prodigiously hurtful, and [who] have any deep regard for the general good, will necessarily
dislike, as a class and in the abstract, those who think wrong what they think right, and right what
they think wrong . . . .
MILL, supra note 5, at 57. Such an aversion to error, continued Mill, partakes “in a certain sense, of the character of
a moral feeling.” Id. This does not mean that one should be a “fanatic,” or “insensible to good qualities in an
opponent,” but one should “throw [one’s] feelings into [one’s] opinions” since it is “truly difficult to understand
how any one, who possesses much of both, [could] fail to do [this].” Id. This can be true even when the differences
between contending positions are small. See e.g., BART EHRMAN, LOST CHRISTIANITIES: THE BATTLES FOR
SCRIPTURE AND THE FAITHS WE NEVER KNEW 160-61, 181-202 (2003) (describing the “vitriolic attacks,”
“polemical treatises,” and “personal slurs” used by early Christians in factional arguments over which particular
Christian beliefs and practices to affirm). Professor Ehrman’s book as a whole shows how the two-thousand-year
history of Christianity may fairly be characterized as one never-ending fight over the nature of orthodoxy.
15
Professor Menkel-Meadow seems to agree. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 347 (“I have long
been concerned with how our grand theories operate in the empirical world.”).
16
DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 29-33 (1986); Leonard
Greenhalgh, Relationships in Negotiations, 3 NEGOT. J. 235, 243 (1987) (“Trust is a vitally important factor in real
world negotiations).
17
The story of one pre-trial conference, a single data point if you will, ordinarily would be a fairly skimpy
basis on which to rest an argument for the inefficacy of any bargaining method. A single set of bargainers might use
tactics and strategies not representative of bargainers generally, have its own distinctive interactional dynamic and
produce unrepresentative results and effects. But the particular conference I will use here did not have any such
idiosyncratic or unusual behavior and the participants used the full range of moves and maneuvers the negotiation
literature suggests is effective in promoting one’s claims. On the whole, the conference looked like the type of
conference one sees regularly in federal and state courts and that was the impression of the participants as well. A
videotape of the conference has been shown to hundreds of lawyers and judges in more than a dozen states and two
foreign countries, and while they often disagree about the appropriateness of particular moves and maneuvers, they
also agree that the conference as a whole presents a realistic, some even say exemplary, picture of court-supervised
pre-trial settlement. The bargaining story told by the conference is a common one, therefore, even if it is not the
only story one could tell about pre-trial conferencing in general, and that is enough for purposes of my analysis. But
so there is no doubt, I will provide much of the detail of what the participants said to one another during the
conference so that readers will be able to judge for themselves what they think about the conference’s
representativeness.
18
For my reservations about storytelling as a method, see Robert J. Condlin, Learning From Colleagues: A
Case Study in the Relationship Between “Academic” and “Ecological” Clinical Legal Education, 3 CLINICAL L.
REV. 337, 349-50 n.29 (1997) (The use of “stories . . . is always an advocacy move, used as much to make a point as
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approach does not work in many real life contexts. A story situates one in the bargaining world
face to face with the tactical and strategic choices lawyers and clients confront and the
consequences attached to making those choices in different ways. From this vantage point it will
be apparent that much of the time bargainers are better off pursuing individual rather than
common ends and that they are more likely to do this successfully if they are secretive as well as
open, argumentative as well as accommodating, suspicious as well as trusting, stubborn as well
as flexible and combative as well as cordial. From the perspective of a skillful bargainer, the
frequently self-defeating properties of an exclusively communitarian approach will be difficult to
miss.
II. Communitarian Bargaining Theory
Parts of communitarian bargaining theory simply codify consensus cultural norms and, as
such, have always been part of the practical wisdom of lawyer bargaining. “Go along to get
along” is an ancient, if crude, example. But the first systematic attempt in legal scholarship to
articulate a communitarian theory of bargaining dates to the late 1970s and the work of Gerald
Williams.19 Williams argued that “the most effective [legal] negotiators [are] characterized by
positive social traits and attitudes and by the use of more open, cooperative and friendly
negotiating strategies.”20 Elaborating, he explained that effective bargainers characteristically
avoid insulting, rude, threatening and belligerent behavior, share information freely and
unguardedly, value their own and their adversary’s interests and needs equally, assess claims
objectively and realistically and do not seek any special advantage for themselves or their
clients.21 Collectively, these qualities define an approach I once described as “cordial
discover one, even if the storyteller does not think so.”); Condlin, supra note 7, at 297 & n.407 (describing the
difficulties in a “resort to narratology”), and references cited therein. The lack of trustworthiness in storytelling
occurs at all levels of the genre. See EHRMAN, supra note 14, at 170 (“What all the differences [in the Gospel
accounts of the death of Jesus] show, great and small, is that each Gospel writer has an agenda – a point of view he
wants to get across, an understanding of Jesus he wants his readers to share. And he has told his stories in such a
way as to convey that agenda.”).
19
GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1983) [herinafter LEGAL
NEGOTIATION]. The Williams book was published in 1983, but the survey research on which it was based was
conducted in the nineteen-seventies. The results were published in articles before the book came out. See Gerald R.
Williams et al., Effectiveness in Legal Negotiation, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 113 (Gordon Bermant et al. eds.,
1976) [hereinafter Effectiveness].
20
Williams, Effectiveness, supra note 19, at 127.
21
Id. Andrea Kupfer Schneider has updated Professor Williams’ research, coming to most of the same
conclusions. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness
of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143 (2002). Like Williams, Professor Schneider bases her findings
on lawyer opinions expressed in response to survey questions about the effectiveness of different negotiation styles
used against them. In justifying the use of survey research, she concludes that “perceptions of effectiveness are an
important measure of what actually occurs in negotiation [and] . . . are the closest we can get to objective
conclusions about effective negotiation behavior.” Id., at 232. Unfortunately, as I will show in this discussion,
lawyer eyewitness testimony about bargaining effectiveness has all of the weaknesses of eyewitness testimony
generally, so that what lawyers describe as effective negotiation practice is not always the best indication of what
actually works in negotiation. Lawyer bargainers, like everyone else, like to think of themselves in flattering terms.
They believe that they respond positively only to behavior that is substantively grounded and personally respectful,
that they cannot be bullied, intimidated, manipulated, coerced, or pressured in any way, and that they meet such
maneuvering head on and in kind. And they report this to people who ask. But much of the time this is just so much
espoused theory and, as Chris Argyris and Donald Schön demonstrated many years ago, espoused theory does not
always reflect theory in use. See ARGYRIS AND SCHÖN, supra note 9, at 6-12 (1974) (describing the differences
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bargaining.”22 It was unfortunate for Williams that his research data did not support the claimed
link between cordiality and effectiveness. Lawyers responding to his surveys indicated that the
most important quality of effective bargaining was not cordiality but, instead, a kind of legal
astuteness that enabled lawyers to make convincing arguments to others.23 Bargainers were
effective, Williams’ subjects reported, to the extent they were “perceptive, analytical, realistic,
convincing, rational, experienced and self-controlled” in the presentation of legal claims.24
These responses did not shake Williams’ faith in the importance of cordiality,25 but they did send
other defenders of communitarian bargaining back to the drawing board for more refined
conceptions of the communitarian approach. The first such refinement, developed by Roger
Fisher, William Ury and their colleagues at the Harvard Negotiation Project (now called the
Project on Negotiation), combined the ideas of cordiality and legal astuteness to produce what
came to be called the theory of principled bargaining.
Principled bargaining asks lawyers to “separate the people from the problem,” “focus on
interests, not positions,” “invent options for mutual gain,” and “insist on [basing agreement] on
objective criteria.”26 The first three of these directives come as no surprise. They reduce to the
common sense suggestion that in bargaining it is useful to “see the situation as the other side sees
it,”27 or put another way, to avoid over-interpretation and projection in deducing another
bargainer’s motives, meanings and purposes. But the fourth directive, the injunction to base
settlement on objective criteria, 28 added an important and non-intuitive element to the
communitarian conception of bargaining and gave the theory of principled bargaining its
jurisprudential bite. Anticipating John Roemer’s criticism of the “informational poverty of
between espoused theory and theory in use); CHRIS ARGYRIS, BEHIND THE FRONT PAGE (1974) (illustrating the
contradictions between what people do and what they say they do using data from the daily workings of a newspaper
editorial department). To discover what actually works in bargaining practice it is necessary to watch lawyers
bargain in addition to asking them how it went.
22
Condlin, supra note 12, at 16.
23
In William’s words, lawyer bargainers were effective in proportion to:
[T]he quality of the legal work being performed, including the expertise with which an attorney had
investigated the facts of his case, studied and understood the legal rules applicable to it, taken a realistic
position with respect to the value of the case, and presented his position in ways that other attorneys
accepted as being rational, fair and persuasive (convincing).
WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION, supra note 19, at 40.
24
Id. at 28, 39, 40.
25
See Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 46 (1996) (“the
negotiation ritual must be performed with understanding and care”). See also Condlin, supra note 12, at 18-19.
26
ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 1112 (1981). There is a second edition of the book, with Bruce Patton as a third author. See FISHER, URY &
PATTON, supra note 6.
27
FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 6, at 23. See also Janos Nyerges, Ten Commandments for a
Negotiator, 3 NEGOT. J. 21, 25 (1987) (“The good negotiator feels the necessity to put himself or herself into the
situation of the other side.”)
28
Id. at 88-89. Objective criteria are standards and procedures that exist independently of each side’s will,
are legitimate and practical, and pass the test of reciprocal application, that is, each side would use them even if their
bargaining situations were reversed. Examples of fair standards included market value, replacement cost,
depreciated book value, competitive prices, scientific judgment, precedent, community practices, traditions, moral
norms, and what a court would decide. Id. Examples of fair procedures included taking turns, drawing lots, letting
someone else decide, and the like. Id. One can see how there could be considerable room for argument over what
constituted fair standards and fair procedures in particular cases. For a critique of the idea of objective criteria, see
Condlin, supra note 12, at 25 n.71, 32-34.
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bargaining,”29 this directive made a start on justifying bargaining’s place in a system of
adjudicatory justice by showing how bargained for results could be legitimate as well as final.
Analogizing to a kind of bilateral, private adjudication, the idea of basing bargained-for
outcomes on objective criteria built on Williams’ idea of legal astuteness and transformed legal
bargaining theory from a theory of strategy and manners to one of morality and politics. For
many commentators, however, who thought that individual interest-based bargaining, no matter
how qualified, was destined to fail, principled bargaining’s reluctance to jettison adjudicatory
methods completely and its incorporation of some features of adversary advocacy, prevented it
from being the final word. For these commentators, a radically new approach was needed, one
that defined bargaining in exclusively communal rather than individualistic terms and that did
not get sidetracked, however well-intendedly, in the destructive quest for correct answers to
substantive questions. This is where the theory of problem-solving bargaining came in.30
The most comprehensive statement of the problem-solving model, that of Carrie MenkelMeadow’s, also was developed at about the same time as the theories of cordial and principled
bargaining. Problem-solving bargainers satisfy the “real,” “underlying,” “basic,” or “actual,”
needs that parties bring to negotiation, rather than their legal needs expressed in the proxies of
money or goods.31 They consider multiple proposals for resolving disagreements simultaneously
and do not get locked into patterns of argumentation and concession over single demands.32
They articulate “reasons why a particular solution is acceptable or unacceptable rather than
simply reject an offer or make a concession.”33 While they sometimes discuss the legal merits of
particular arguments, one of the “primary advantages” of problem-solving bargaining “is that no
judgment need be made about whose [legal] argument is right [and whose is] . . . wrong.”34
Problem solvers also seek out shared interests, explore value differences, look to third parties for
contributions, aggregate and disaggregate resources, seek substitute goods and exploit the long
and short term values of the parties,35 until they reach agreements that satisfy everyone. They
distribute bargained-for material fully among the parties rather than waste it on argumentative
wrangling or leave it on the table because of an inability to agree and they reconfigure

29

John Roemer, The Mismarriage of Bargaining Theory and Distributive Justice, 97 ETHICS 88, 90, 97-102
(1986) (arguing that bargaining theory lacks the sophistication necessary to consider questions of distributive
justice).
30
Problem-solving bargaining has both a warm and fuzzy version grounded in the literature of humanistic
psychology (CARL R. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON: A THERAPIST’S VIEW OF PSYCHOTHERAPY (1961)), and a
hard and scientific version grounded in the literature of economics and game theory (ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1985)). There are major differences between the two versions, though each believes
it is better to coordinate than fight, but for different reasons.
31
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving,
31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 794 n.155, 795 (1984). Professor Menkel-Meadow has written quite a bit more about the
problem-solving model since this early piece but to the extent that anything has changed it has been in the direction
of making her model less distinctive. Compare Id., at 826 (not necessary to argue the substantive merits of the
parties’ claims to settle a dispute) with Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 600 (arguing substantive merits of the
parties’ claims can advance settlement).
32
Id. at 822.
33
Id. at 825.
34
Id. at 826. Not all individual variants of the method share this agnosticism about the role of argument on
the merits in bargaining. See e.g., John S. Murray, Understanding Competing Theories of Negotiation, 2 NEGOT. J.
179, 182-85 (1986) (“the problem-solving negotiator . . . us[es] the merits as a central negotiating focus”).
35
Id. at 813.
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agreements until it is no longer possible to make them more efficient.36 Collectively, they focus
attention on “solving the problem . . . rather than winning the argument.”37
At first glance, problem-solving bargaining might seem to be a slightly dressed up
restatement of principled and cordial bargaining and to a large extent it is. All three approaches
share the common premise that adversarial position-taking is the major cause of bargaining
breakdowns,38 assume that the underlying interests of adverse parties are invariably compatible
and trust that bargainers who are sufficiently skillful and flexible always can find common
ground. But the theories also are different and the key to the differences lies in the contrasting
adjectives each uses to identify the essential character of bargaining.39 Principled bargaining is
grounded in the belief that legal, moral and social principles are available to dictate the solution
to any dispute and that these principles can be found in the set of background cultural norms,
both explicit and tacit, that lawyers and clients accept as authoritative. Problem-solving
bargaining, by contrast, sees the attitude and skill of individual bargainers as the key to success.
While background norms can be useful, it is the bargainers’ willingness to treat bargaining
problems as joint ventures in which the shared interest in reaching an agreement outweighs each
individual bargainer’s interest in reaching her or his most favorable agreement that has the
biggest influence on settlement.40 Cordial bargaining, by contrast, assumes that it is enough to
be nice, that this will cause others to reciprocate and that reciprocal niceness inevitably will
produce a succession of pleasant, non-self-interested, mutual concessions leading to agreement.41
36

Id. at 822.
Id.
38
See FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 6, at 4-5, 12, 82-83, 91, and 152, for a description of positional
or adversarial bargaining.
39
One also might see this as a difference among the various metaphors each uses to visualize the nature of
bargaining interdependence. See Greenhalgh, supra note 16, at 236 (“The choice of metaphor can make a big
difference in a negotiator’s definition of the relationship [with another negotiator]).
40
Proponents of problem-solving bargaining may have backed away somewhat from this aversion to using
substantive principles to settle disputes and, if so, they have effaced the difference between themselves and the
proponents of principled bargaining even further. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 600 (extolling the
“‘substantive’ problem-solving possibilities of negotiations that are conducted through analysis, rational thinking,
and coordination, rather than power-plays, competition and deception.”)
41
See, e.g., CHARLES E. OSGOOD, AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR OR SURRENDER (1962) (describing the
“graduated reciprocation of tension reduction” method of negotiation, in which bargainers make unilateral
concessions as a means of inducing their adversaries to reciprocate); Joseph P. Forgas, On Feeling Good and
Getting Your Way: Mood Effects on Negotiator Cognition and Bargaining Strategies, 74 J. PERSONALITY AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 565, 574 (1988) (describing how negotiators in an experimentally induced good mood have a
kind of “emotional contagion” that induces cooperative behavior in others); Leigh Thompson et al., Some Like it
Hot: The Case for the Emotional Negotiator, in SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE MANAGEMENT OF
KNOWLEDGE 139, 142 (L. Thompson et al. eds., 1999) (hypothesizing that the trusting attitude implicit in
cooperative behavior may stimulate reciprocal behavior in others); Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Negotiating
Via Information Technology: Theory and Application, 58 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 109 (2002) (describing social contagion
as “the spread of affect, attitude, or behavior from Person A (‘the initiator’) to Person B (‘the recipient’) where the
recipient does not perceive an intentional influence attempt on the part of the initiator;” and describing the form
most relevant to the study of legal negotiation as echo contagion, “which occurs when a social actor imitates or
reflects spontaneously the affect or behavior of an initiator.”); Clark Freshman, Adele Hayes & Greg Feldman, The
Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist: What We Know and Don’t Know About How Mood Relates to Successful
Negotiation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, (2002) (describing how negotiators in a positive mood get significantly larger
joint gains); Chris Guthrie, Principles of Influence in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 829 (describing the natural
urge to reciprocate as the “fourth principle of influence that a lawyer might use” to “induce her counterpart to settle
on terms that are advantageous to her [the lawyer’s] client.”).
37

9

Think of this as a belief in niceness as its own reward.
This burst of bargaining scholarship in the late 1970s and early 1980s established the
general analytical framework for communitarian bargaining theory and Professors Williams,
Fisher and Ury and Menkel-Meadow legitimately may be thought of as the theory’s parents, at
least legally.42 Like all good parents, of course, they have had precocious, dutiful and unruly
children but, for the most part, their successors in interest have not so much changed the original
communitarian model as combined it with other bodies of scholarship, or rearranged its various
components, to produce hybrid rather than competitor variations. Since the mid-1980s, in fact,
there has been such a steady stream of refinements to, or modifications of, the communitarian
model that the debate over its content now often seems to be the only scholarly bargaining game
in town.43 Noteworthy among these efforts is Professor Riskin’s pairing of communitarian
42

For examples of contemporaneous literature in related fields, on which legal scholars drew, see THOMAS
C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960); RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A
BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (1965); ARTHUR LALL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION
(1966); CHESTER L. KARRASS, THE NEGOTIATING GAME (1970); OMAR J. BARTOS, PROCESS & OUTCOME OF
NEGOTIATIONS (1974); JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND
NEGOTIATION (1975); ORAN R. YOUNG, BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION (1975); DANIEL
DRUCKMAN, NEGOTIATIONS: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1977); P.H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND
NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1979); DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR (1981);
SAMUEL B. BACHARACH & EDWARD J. LAWLER, BARGAINING: POWER, TACTICS, AND OUTCOMES (1981); I.
WILLIAM ZARTMAN & MAUREEN R. BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR (1982); HOWARD L. RAIFFA, THE ART
AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1985); and LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 16.
43
See Peppet, supra note 8, at 484-97 (describing debates among the various communitarian models of
bargaining). Perhaps the best evidence of the dominance of the communitarian (and cognitive and social
psychological) model in bargaining scholarship is found in the second edition of the Wiggins and Lowry anthology.
See WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 4. Fewer than a dozen (out of one hundred and sixteen) article excerpts in the
book are critical of the communitarian model, for example, and each of these is usually buried at the end of a chapter
in which the other excerpts extol various features of the communitarian approach. In addition, the anthology’s
section on bargaining advocacy, the central component of an adversarial or positional method, is the weakest and
second shortest in the book. Id., at 363-83. It does not include a single excerpt from the vast literature on Rhetoric
dating from Aristotle to the present, for example, and it treats the issue of bargaining “fairness” as a purely social
psychological phenomenon, leaving the philosophical literature out of the picture altogether. For philosophy based
discussions of bargaining fairness see e.g., David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO.
L. J. 2619 (1995); David Luban, Bargaining and Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation and Informal Justice,
14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 397 (1985); Roemer, supra note 29. One of its article excerpts even limits discussion to
perceptions of fairness, seemingly on the belief that it is no longer possible to get the real thing, see Welsh, supra
note 3, at (“People often disagree . . . whether an outcome is fair . . . The definition of distributive fairness is,
therefore, inevitably subjective.”), and another confuses perceptions of fairness with fairness simpliciter. See Leigh
Thompson and Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases in Conflict Resolution and How to Overcome Them, in MORTON
DEUTSCH AND PETER T. COLEMAN (eds.) THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 213, 224-25 (2000). Typically, the book depicts bargainers as programmed agents at the mercy of their
tacit heuristics, biases and urges and easily manipulated by framing tricks, salience concerns, and other socialpsychological forces and maneuvers. See Craig Lambert, The Marketplace of Perceptions, 108 HARV. MAG. 50
(No. 4, March-April 2006) (describing the development of the field of behavioral economics, “the study of how real
people actually make choices”). There are few self-conscious, evaluating and deciding actors in the bargaining
universe described by Wiggins and Lowry and seemingly no one who has read Kahneman and Tversky. This might
be explained, in part, by the fact that much of the social psychological literature on which Wiggins and Lowry draw
is based on experiments using law and business school students as subjects and students are less fully socialized
bargainers than are seasoned practitioners. See e.g., Jeffrey Rachlinksi, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of
Litigation, 70 SO. CAL. L. REV. 113, 127-128 (1996) (describing the influence of “framing effects” on Cornell law
students’ decisions of whether to accept settlements in a hypothetical bargaining exercise). It is sad that Kahneman

10

bargaining with mindfulness meditation (“a method of non-judgmental, moment-to-moment
attention developed some 2500 years ago by the Buddha”), to create a bargaining method that
permits the “thoughtful negotiator” to escape the “egocentric cravings” that dominate the
lawyer’s “Standard Philosophical Map.”44 Professors Korobkin and Guthrie, among others, have
mined the rich social-psychological literature on “prospect theory” produced by Daniel
Kahnemann, Amos Tversky and their colleagues, to flesh out the communitarian skeleton in
sophisticated and subtle ways, as well as provide a more substantial defense of the theory’s
effectiveness than that previously in place.45 Scott Peppet has constructed a contractarian
version of the theory that encourages lawyers to bargain self-consciously over the nature of their
bargaining as well as the particulars of their disputes,46 while Robert Cochran has grounded a
similar view in religious belief47 and Donald Gifford has combined adversarial and
communitarian methods into a single, context-dependent hybrid.48 Clever and thoughtful as
these (and other such) variations are, however, they remain as untested against the reality of
actual bargaining practice as the original communitarian model and this is a serious concern.
and Tversky have suffered this fate. In the hands of legal bargaining scholars the useful concepts of “heuristics and
biases” have become another “paradigm,” an interesting idea ground into near unintelligibility by overuse. (Perhaps
authors whose last name begins with K should not do seminal work.) All of that said, however, the anthology is still
the most important anthology on legal bargaining both because it is the only one and because, in areas where it is
expert, it is quite good. Negotiation text books generally evidence the same tacit biases. Of all the books in the
field, for example, few show any real sympathy for the adversarial model and those that do qualify that sympathy in
numerous ways. See e.g., CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (5th ed.
2005); JAY FOLBERG, DWIGHT GOLANN, LISA KLOPPENBERG & THOMAS STIPANOWICH, RESOLVING DISPUTES:
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 43-53, 69-70 (2005). Among the commentators, Donald Gifford, Gerald Wetlaufer
and Scott Peppet are particularly good at blending communitarian and adversarial methods in an intelligent and
sophisticated manner. See e.g., Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal
Negotiation, 46 OHIO STATE L. J. 41, 82-88 ( 1985) (describing how competitive and cooperative bargaining
strategies can be used in combination depending upon situational factors); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Rhetorics of
Negotiations (July 23, 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=770545; Peppet, supra note 8, at
535 (“[C]ollaboration does not mean revealing all of one’s information, preferences, interests, and litigation
strategies”). Not all legal bargaining scholarship is social-psychologically based. There is an older body of
literature grounded in economics that remains influential though it is usually concerned more with the incentive and
constraint structure of bargaining practice than with individual bargainer skill. See e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent
Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV.
319 (1991).
44
Riskin, supra note 4, at . See also Freshman, et al., supra note 41, at (describing how cognitivebehavioral techniques based on mindfulness meditation have been shown to promote long term mood management).
These various approaches to bargaining can be seen as vectors of the so-called “comprehensive law movement,” the
principal subdivisions of which are therapeutic jurisprudence, preventive law, creative problem-solving, holistic law,
alternative dispute resolution, and collaborative law. Each of these views shares a common concern for client
personal needs and emotional well being in addition to legal rights. See SUSAN S. DAICOFF, LAWYER, KNOW
THYSELF: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PERSONALITY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 169-202 (2004).
45
RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 156-71 (2002); Russell Korobkin, supra
note 3; Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 43 (1999). For the original work, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect
Theory: Cumulative Representations of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992).
46
See Peppet, supra note 8.
47
Robert Cochran, Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpractice
for Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 819 (1990).
48
Gifford, supra note 43. Perhaps the best work has been done outside the legal academy. See LAX &
SEBENIUS, supra note 16.
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The usefulness of any bargaining theory ultimately depends not just on the elegance of its design
but on its ability to explain and inform the practice of bargaining. If it’s “not in the rocks,” as
geologists say, it should not be in the theory. Most attempts to determine whether
communitarian bargaining theory is “in the [legal] rocks” have been indirect and artificial (i.e.,
simulated student bargaining exercises conducted as part of law and business school courses),
and the limited data available from actual bargaining practice usually consists of lawyer opinions
rather than direct observations on how lawyers bargain. Opinion evidence is notoriously suspect,
however. Lawyers are not trained empiricists and they have strong incentives to tell stories that
are better than the reality they purport to describe. With many of these opinions, in fact, often,
the price is the only thing that is right. One must analyze communitarian bargaining methods in
their natural habitat, so to speak, to learn if they truly work, and to do that we turn to the Drillco
case.
III.

Paine v. Drillco: A Story of a Negotiation
A. The Case

Phillip Paine (Paine), a former employee of the Drill Corporation (Drillco), a United
States based oil company with refineries throughout the world, sued Drillco for wrongful
termination. Paine had worked for Drillco for twelve years at the time the dispute arose and held
the position of Electrical Supervisor (his duties consisted of doing “general electrical work”), in
the company’s Sampson Refinery in Charlottesville, Virginia. Paine was offered an opportunity
to take a one-year overseas assignment to work for Drillco Services Venezuela (Drillco
Venezuela), a wholly owned subsidiary, on a refinery upgrade project in Amuay, Venezuela. He
and six other Drillco employees were given the details of the assignment at an orientation
meeting at the Sampson Refinery two months before the assignment was to begin. They were
told that they would receive a thirty-five percent increase in salary while in Venezuela, twentyfive percent of which would be a bonus for working overseas and the other ten percent a
hardship supplement. The employees also were told that they could take their families with them
to Venezuela and were shown slides of the housing available on the Drillco Venezuela
compound. The housing consisted of both fixed foundation brick houses and mobile homes;
employees with children were to be given preference for the fixed foundation housing. Paine
and two of the other interested employees had three children each. The employees also were told
that they could return to the United States during their time in Venezuela only for emergencies
and that the company would determine what constituted an emergency. Paine accepted the
assignment and moved with his family to Venezuela in August of the same year.
Upon arriving in Venezuela, Paine and his family were assigned mobile home housing.
He was the only employee with children not given a fixed foundation house. Paine was AfricanAmerican and the other employees were Caucasian. Paine complained about the housing
assignment to his Venezuelan supervisors, arguing that the mobile home was not what he had
been promised and that it was not comparable to the housing given to white employees. The
company made a subsequent offer of a fixed foundation house, but it was in the nearby town of
Judibana and not on the company compound. Paine concluded that the Judibana house was
inferior to the mobile home so he declined the offer.
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In November, three months later, Paine decided to return to the United States to resolve
problems associated with his home mortgage and to assist his mother-in-law while she was
undergoing surgery. He testified that he asked his Venezuelan supervisors for permission to
make this trip and they granted it. He left Venezuela with his family to go to the United States
on December sixteenth and returned to Venezuela the following January first. Upon his return,
Paine’s Venezuelan supervisors ordered him to return to the Sampson Refinery, alleging that he
had “left Venezuela without permission.” During the course of an investigation by officials at
Sampson Paine claimed that he had been given permission to leave Venezuela, but when the
Sampson officials checked with Paine’s Venezuelan supervisors they denied this. The
Venezuelan supervisors also said that when they checked with the travel agent Paine used to
book his trip, they learned that he had made his reservations in September long before he
claimed to have learned about the mortgage problem and his mother-in-law’s surgery. Based on
this information, Drillco fired Paine for leaving Venezuela without permission and for lying to
the company about the circumstances surrounding his leaving.
Paine filed a complaint in federal district court for the Eastern District of Virginia
alleging that his housing assignment and firing were racially motivated in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,49 and section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.50 He asked
for a jury trial under the § 1981 claim. In his prayer for relief he asked for forty-two thousand
dollars in damages, six thousand dollars a month for the seven months of his assignment he had
not been allowed to complete and for attorney’s fees. Subsequently, he found new employment
as an electrician with another company but at a greatly reduced salary (eleven hundred and
twenty dollars a month). He started the new job one year to the day after the commencement of
his Venezuelan assignment. Drillco denied that it discriminated against Paine. It said that the
Venezuelan housing assignments were made on a random basis and that if any particular
employee did better than any other, good fortune rather than malevolence was the cause. It also
argued that Paine left Venezuela without permission in December of his year there and that he
lied to company officials about having permission to make the trip. He was fired, according to
Drillco, because of this lie and because he breached the company’s travel policy and not because
he was black.
A pre-trial order filed with the District Court identified the contested facts in the dispute
as whether “the working conditions at Drillco Refinery Venezuela and the facts surrounding
Paine’s request to return to the United States [were] the reasons for Paine’s termination.” The
legal question in dispute was described as whether there was any discrimination against Paine on
the basis of race.” The pre-trial conference was presided over by an experienced and highly
regarded federal magistrate who was soon to become a federal district judge. The defendant was
represented by a senior Title VII partner at one of the country’s (now world’s) largest law firms
and the plaintiff was represented by a former staff lawyer for the United Auto Workers and a
former Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of California, both of whom
had extensive Title VII litigation experience. All of the participants were highly successful
lawyers and were regarded as leading practitioners in their respective areas of concentration.
The conference lasted two and one-half hours.51 By the time it was over the Paine lawyers had
49

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
51
The conference was videotaped and the tape was transcribed. The Drillco problem and the case materials
50
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modified the magistrate’s understanding of the substantive issues in the case and his corollary
evaluation of what the case was worth and he, in turn, had imposed that changed view on the
Drillco lawyer. One would not have expected such a one-sided result in a negotiation among
such evenly matched lawyers, but understanding how it happened will help illustrate the limits of
a communitarian approach to legal bargaining.
1) The Full Group Meeting
The conference began quietly, with the participants sitting around an octagonal able in a
modestly furnished room. The magistrate spoke first, explaining the purpose of the meeting,52
and telling the parties that another judge would try the case should settlement efforts fail.53 He
that go with it were prepared by Professor Steven Saltzburg for the Viginia Advocacy Institute. The actual case on
which the problem was based (a New Jersey federal district court action involving a major American oil company),
had been settled but the participants in the Drillco conference were not involved in that settlement and were not
informed of its terms. They had the full set of documents and testimony (i.e., pleadings, motions, rulings, deposition
transcripts, correspondence, relevant documents, pictures and physical evidence, as well as legal research and
witness profile memoranda), from the original case, all appropriately modified to make the case anonymous. They
did not know any of the original parties and witnesses.
There always is a concern that observer-effects will alter the behavior of participants in a videotaped
performance, that they will act a little like MTV reality show characters and play to the camera in an effort to call
attention to themselves, but there is no evidence that this happened in the Drillco conference. The taping was done
unobtrusively, in an ordinary conference room, with only the lawyers and magistrate present. No cameras,
microphones, wires, or other such recording equipment were visible. There was little to remind the participants that
they were being watched. Moreover, because the conference lasted for almost three hours there was ample time for
any latent awareness of the staged nature of the meeting to pass from consciousness. All of the participants were
experienced litigators, accustomed to performing in public, and when the conference was over they described the
experience as identical to the real thing, right down to the sweaty palms at the end of the last full group meeting
when they were worried they would not be able to finalize the deal. No one reported being self-conscious of the
taping, even when asked, and all were surprised by some of their behavior on the tape, unaware that they had said
and done such things. They also looked and sounded like they did in non-videotaped situations.
There is a sense in which the Drillco conference is not representative of legal dispute bargaining generally.
It bears little resemblance, for example, to one of the most common forms of legal bargaining, the bureaucratized
negotiation of criminal pleas that takes place between prosecutors and defense attorneys in the corridors of court
houses while cases are waiting to be called. Plea bargaining is a truncated, to-the-point, and limited process that is
based on an elaborately developed and jointly held set of internalized categories designed to dispose of most cases
routinely and reserve true bargaining for genuinely new problems. The format and time frame of the Drillco pretrial conference are luxuries plea-bargaining rarely enjoys. Such conferences usually are limited to large civil
disputes that cost a great deal to try and that involve great risk for both sides (so that settlement is preferable). It is
easier to study lawyer bargaining technique in the formal pre-trial conference context, however, because the moves
and maneuvers lawyers use are out in plain sight, in larger than life proportions, for all to see. Moreover, tactics and
strategies that work in these conference also work in the lesser included case of bureaucratic bargaining once they
are appropriately downsized and "arranged" (in the musical sense). I limit discussion to a single, final-meeting
version of the pre-trial conference because I want to discuss the effects of face-to-face bargaining technique, rather
than those of structural or time constraints, on bargaining outcomes, but I do not mean to minimize the importance
of the latter. When one builds extended breaks into the bargaining conversation (in the form of multiple meetings
spaced over time), and gives bargainers an opportunity to reflect on how things are going, techniques that work
when there is limited time to react often do not work as well, and sometimes do not work at all.
52
“So that we could talk about the prospects of settlement of the case.” Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial
Conference at 10.
53
“Judge T will be trying this case.” Id. Having different judges for settlement and trial has important
consequences for how settlement is conducted and the type of information the parties are willing to share. This
topic has been the subject of quite a bit of discussion in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., Harold Baer, Jr., History,
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introduced himself to the Paine lawyers,54 whom he did not know and asked if there had been
“any settlement discussion among counsel.”55 When both sides answered no, in effect,56 he
summarized their answers as “then . . . there's no demand that's been made or offer on the
table.”57 He concluded this opening segment by describing the nature of the proceeding58 and
the extent of Paine’s claims.59 Very few pleasantries were exchanged, there was almost no small
talk and all of the parties seemed very serious. It was a civil, businesslike, somewhat
perfunctory beginning and otherwise unremarkable in every way.
Once the parties began to discuss particular issues in the case, however, a controversy
arose almost immediately over whether Paine was entitled to more than economic damages.
Both the magistrate and the Drillco lawyer assumed that the pre-trial order limited Paine’s
recovery to damages for economic loss, but the Paine lawyers believed that it also permitted
damages for emotional trauma.60 This was an important issue, since its resolution would change
the dollar value of the case substantially. A lengthy, but un-spirited discussion ensued, with the
magistrate emphasizing the fact that local rules required damages to be itemized and pointing out
that Paine had failed to plead any non-economic loss in his complaint and the Paine lawyers
arguing that the pre-trial order was ambiguous and that a plaintiff is entitled to “all damages
flowing from [his] . . . wrongful discharge.”61 The discussion might have ended when the
magistrate seemed to reject this argument,62 but the Paine lawyers persisted,63 and the
conversation continued for an additional few minutes. This pattern would prove prophetic. The
discussion eventually died out more than ended when the Paine lawyers shifted the conversation
to a discussion of Paine’s income from his new job and never returned to the question of whether
non-economic damages were recoverable. This half-hearted exchange would turn out to be a
warm-up for more robust things to come.
At that point the parties raised the first major liability issue in dispute, that of whether
Paine was assigned substandard housing because he was black. The entire discussion took about
eight minutes. The magistrate asked the Paine lawyers to describe the facts that “essentially

Process, and a Role for Judges in Mediating Their Own Cases, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 131 (2001); Daisy
Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That?: The Need for a Clearer Judicial Role in Settlement, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45
(1994); James A. Wall & Lawrence F. Schiller, Judicial Involvement in Pre-Trial Settlement: A Judge is Not a Bump
on a Log, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 27 (1982).
54
“Mr. B I know you well of course, and I’m afraid I haven’t encountered either of you before.” Transcript
of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 11.
55
Id. at 10.
56
Paine: “some modest;” Drillco: “nothing of real substance” Id.
57
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 11.
58
“The entire case will be tried to a jury.” Id.
59
“The two claims are Title VII and 1981” and “pendent state civil rights act claims, wrongful discharge,
breach of contract.” Id.
60
The pre-trial order itself was silent on the issue, stating only that “the issue of damages will not be tried
separately from that of quantum.” Pre-Trial Order in Paine v. Drillco, at 3.
61
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 13.
62
“There is nothing in the pre-trial order about [non-economic] damage . . . . Now if you want to try to
amend that you can talk to Judge T about it . . . but I’m just pointing out that it may be a little late for that kind of
stuff.” Id. at 14. This comment revealed a private fear of the magistrate’s that the Paine lawyers would benefit
from, albeit unselfconsciously.
63
“I’m not at all certain that any amendment is required.” Id. at 15.
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make out that there was racial motivation in the assignment of housing.”64 The lawyers had just
begun to answer65 when the magistrate interrupted to argue with them.66 The next three
exchanges were similarly truncated, with the Paine lawyers giving short answers to narrow,
leading, almost rhetorical magistrate questions and never fully explaining why the assignment
was discriminatory.67 The magistrate then turned to the Drillco lawyer, asking “what kind of
documentation [does Drillco have] with regard to how that housing decision was made?”68 The
magistrate asked narrow, leading questions and the lawyer gave short, incomplete answers. In
the transcript, the magistrate appears to be cross examining the lawyer, though on the video tape
his demeanor and tone seem curious and inquisitive more than controlling.
It took almost two minutes for the Drillco lawyer’s argument to emerge fully,69 and
another four minutes for the Paine lawyers’ rebuttal70 to come out. Midway through the
exchange, before the Paine lawyers had finished making their argument, the magistrate seemed
to take sides, arguing in an unusually long statement that Drillco’s position was “pretty strong.”71
As in the discussion of damages, however, the Paine lawyers continued to press their position,72
arguing from a “series of . . . prima facie cases”73 and this seemed to cause the magistrate to back
away slightly from his "pretty strong" view. Neither party’s arguments were developed much
64

Id. at 16.
“Well, other employees similarly situated . . . “ Id.
66
“Yes, but the other two had four children, didn’t they?” Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 16.
67
MA:
In terms of the plaintiff’s situation, how long was he without work altogether?”
P1:
He was without work, if I remember correctly, for a month or two, but he has been
severely underemployed compared to the pay he was earning both prior to the trip to
Venezuela, and certainly during the trip to Venezuela.
DA:
Well, as I recall, his training is mostly on the job training, isn’t it? That he got with this
employer, with the previous employer that he’s suing now?
P1:
I’m not so sure that’s . . .
MA:
[Interrupting] I don’t think he’s got a whole lot of technical education [does he]?
P1:
He was in maintenance – electrical maintenance, which is very technical. I would think
that is highly skilled. And he was a supervisor in fact.
MA:
Right. Is he in the same line?
P1:
Yes, but not at the supervisory level.
65

Id. at 15.

68
69

Id. at 16.
“The problem was that the availability of these houses was not what Drillco had anticipated it would be.”

Id. at 17.

70
“The McDonnell-Douglas inference is strengthened when one has not one but two or three series of
McDonnell-Douglas prima facie cases.” Id. at 20.
71
“Well you’d qualify! It doesn’t say if you got three families with three more children and two houses to
put them in, obviously somebody’s going to get left out. Now if you put the plaintiff in one of them that means one
of the families that’s got four kids is left out. So, I mean that, somebody is going bear the brunt of a family living in
a trailer. And of course, the bottom line is that you all have to prove that it was racially motivated, and they’ve got a
pretty strong—It seems to me—if you look at this in a McDonnell-Douglas context, which I think you’ve got to, I
don’t know anything precisely in the Fourth Circuit that deals with this, but I think that you use that same kind of
burden shifting prima facie. The prima facie case is that the families who were put in family housing were white, he
is black, he was not. Then there comes up his burden to articulate whichever non-discriminatory reason, which is
four kids v. three, as to both of the families, and then you’ve got the burden of proving that by preponderance to be a
pretext. Isn’t that right?” Id. at 18.
72
“I would agree with that assessment with two qualifications . . . .” Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial
Conference at 18.
73
Id. at 20.
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beyond their initial formulations, probably because the magistrate's relentless, short-answer
questioning made elaboration difficult.
Near the end of this discussion the Paine lawyers made an oblique reference to two
additional claims, one pleaded (breach of contract) and the other not (assignment to a lower job
status). The magistrate seemed to dismiss the claims peremptorily,74 and counsel did not pursue
them, at least not at that time. But immediately after the mention of the second of the two
claims, the magistrate asked the Drillco lawyer “to address the idea that all these things sort of
build up?”75 When the lawyer responded flippantly76 the magistrate gave his first indication that
he thought there might be something to Paine’s case.77 The parties then concluded the housing
assignment discussion with a short and inconclusive examination of whether Paine was situated
similarly (i.e., had the same size family) to white employees assigned fixed foundation housing,
the proper interpretation to be given the “working in a foreign country” provisions of the
Company's housing brochure and whether Paine’s seniority should have been taken into account
in making his housing assignment.78 The magistrate remained uncharacteristically inactive
throughout most of this discussion, betraying little commitment to, or approval of, the arguments
of one or the other side.
Up until now, when the magistrate participated in the discussion he usually sided with
Drillco, supporting the Drillco lawyer’s arguments directly and challenging the arguments made
by the Paine lawyers. It is difficult to be sure from these early comments, however, just how
much of a preconceived view the magistrate brought to the conference. At some points he
seemed genuinely curious, asking open-ended questions about evidence, testimony and the
parties’ respective theories of the case. Yet, at other times he controlled the conversation with
leading, short answer questions, unilateral topic shifts and strong statements in favor of one or
the other party (almost invariably Drillco), suggesting that he already had made up his mind.
This pattern presented an interesting question of how to respond. The Paine lawyers seemed to
assume that the magistrate meant what he said only when it was favorable to them and disputed
negative points vigorously, while the Drillco lawyer usually agreed with the magistrate’s views
whether favorable or not. In retrospect, the Paine lawyers’ approach turned out to be the wiser
course.

74

With respect to the breach of contract argument, the magistrate responded: “You’re going to turn this
into a three week trial instead of a two day trial, if you start contract, because then they’re going to bring in the
contractor to testify as to why the thing wasn’t finished, and then you’ll say the contractor breached his contract, and
we get into a monumental brouhaha.” In response, plaintiff’s attorney agreed, for the moment, to “leave aside the
breach of contract point.” With respect to the assignment to a lower status argument, the magistrate responded:
“Was that part of your claim? I haven’t seen that articulated as a claim. I mean that’s sort of floating around in the
deposition, but I didn’t gather [plaintiff] is very upset about that.” In response, plaintiff then re-characterized the
significance of job assignment, arguing only that it was one of “the series of several discrete instances which are
mutually corroborative of the racial motive that one can infer under the prima facie case.” Id. at 19-20.
75
Id. at 21.
76
“Yes, your honor, I would like to. It seems to me that this is, plaintiff’s argument here is zero plus zero
plus zero equals something.” Id.
77
“Problem is, if there’s one tenth of something there . . . “ Id.
78
The Drillco lawyer argued that seniority was an important factor. As he put it, “as a practical matter you
just don’t—it doesn’t do much for getting the job done as a whole if you are putting subordinate employees in better
housing than management.” Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 23.
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After a brief and unproductive aside about Paine’s claim that he was “assign[ed] to a
lower job status” than he had with the company in the United States, which the magistrate
rejected because it was not pleaded,79 the parties discussed “the whole thing about the vacation
and all that stuff.”80 First, was the issue of whether Paine’s December trip to the United States
was authorized by the company's written policy on leave. The written policy restricted leave to
emergency81 situations but because “other employees were allowed vacation type leave”
(according to the depositions of company supervisors), the magistrate viewed the policy as
“more honored in the breach than the observance.”82 The Drillco lawyer agreed, but argued that
even if Paine was entitled to vacation leave he was required to “have permission” before he
could leave Venezuela.83 The Paine lawyers’ counter, that Paine’s Venezuelan supervisors
(Nunez and Hernandez) told him he could go, turned the issue into a swearing contest between
Paine and the Venezuelan supervisors.
The magistrate intervened to ask whether the supervisors would appear Black to the jury
and thus be believed because not likely to testify falsely against another Black employee. This
discussion took a surprisingly long time given that none of the lawyers had met the supervisors
and eventually it ended in an impasse. The Paine lawyers tried to break the impasse by arguing
that, Black or not, a jury would understand that employees who were “afraid of getting fired if
they . . . [told] the truth,” would say whatever the company wanted them to say, truthful or not.84
This provoked a heated exchange over the supervisors' employment status and their vulnerability
to being fired.85 The magistrate agreed with the Paine lawyers that “there [was] some practical . .
. [company] control over [the supervisors],” and the topic was dropped.86 The Drillco lawyer
tried to extend the point by arguing that Paine’s testimony about asking for permission to go to
the United States was inconsistent with company records, but the Paine lawyers dismissed the
testimony as evidencing only an understandable mixup about confusing dates and the Drillco
lawyer did not pursue the topic. The discussion of the vacation trip then ended, seemingly
without any effect.
The discussion of the vacation trip was a good deal livelier than the discussion of the
assignment to sub-standard housing. The lawyers seemed to be warming to the task. Their
comments were sharper, more confrontational and faster paced than in the earlier discussion and
the overall tone of the discussion was more intense. Even the magistrate was quicker to argue
points and not always willing to wait, as he had earlier, for the parties to present their views first.
The lawyers argued with one another directly as well as through the magistrate. They debated
the meaning of statutes and case law, the significance of deposition testimony and documentary
79

“Yeah, but you haven’t got a claim for that . . . .” The Paine lawyers responded by arguing that the
evidence was relevant to their other claims. “Case law suggests that matters that may not be plead [sic] for recovery
in damages may nevertheless be highly probative in the motive with regard to another decision.” Id. at 24.
80
Id. at 26.
81
The Drillco lawyer described an emergency as, “only if your mother or your wife’s mother is dying,
something in that line.” Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 26-27.
84
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 29.
85
The Drillco lawyer argued that the supervisors worked for the independent “Venezuelan governmental
entity that ran the refinery” and the Paine lawyers argued that they worked for the company. Id. at 31.
86
Id. at 32.
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evidence and the credibility of witnesses, all with the skill and enthusiasm one would expect of
lawyers this good. Most of the debates ended in impasse, usually when one or another lawyer
gave an unresponsive answer, repeated a familiar point, or sat silently with nothing new to say.87
When this happened the magistrate would intervene to shift the topic. The conversation as a
whole looked more like a test of advocacy skill and energy level than a bi-partisan effort to
figure out what had happened to Paine, or what the law required be done. The Drillco lawyer
seemed to have slightly the better of the argument, though there is no indication that the Paine
lawyers thought this to be true, or that their resolve weakened to any noticeable degree.
Next, the full group considered Paine’s claim that he returned to the United States to
resolve a problem with his mortgage. The Drillco lawyer took the lead and never relinquished it,
arguing, somewhat more sharply than he had until then, that Paine was a liar. His opening
statement is representative.
DA:88 I think that this is a very interesting aspect of the case. One of the principal
reasons, aside from Paine’s mother's varicose veins for him coming back to the
United States around Christmas time, was this business with his mortgage. He
got a letter from his bank saying that there was a problem with his mortgage and
they were going to foreclose. He goes into [his supervisor's] office, uses the long
distance telephone back to the United States, tries to get it worked out. And he
goes back and tells his wife, “Gee, I hope we will be able to get this thing worked
out.” Well, then suddenly they haven't gotten it worked out and he says, that is
Paine says, “The banker told me that I had to personally come back to the United
States and sit down in front of a bank officer and sign that form and therefore I
had to come back and do that because they were going to foreclose on my
mortgage.” That makes a damn good story. The only problem is it's not true.
Because [the officer] from the bank, who is independent and could care less about
this lawsuit, testified he never told Paine any such thing about having to come
back to the United States. It's totally . . . would not be necessary. The papers
could be sent down to him and as a matter of fact, a couple of days after that
conversation on the nineteenth of October, [the bank officer] sends a letter down
and says “Here's what you can do. Fill out this card and send it in.” Now
whether or . . . [Paine’s lawyer interrupted at this point to argue that the "letter
never got there.”]89
This statement was a good deal longer and louder than any until then and when combined
with the sarcasm and belligerence in the lawyer’s voice ratcheted up the attack on Paine.90 In a
87

I once described argument of this sort as having the form of “salvo-salvo-truce.” See Condlin, supra note
7, at 112 n.81.
88
I will use the following identifying designations when quoting from the transcript of the conference: DA
– Drillco Attorney; P1 – First Paine Attorney; P2 – Second Paine Attorney; and MA – Magistrate.
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Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 35.
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The reasons for this change in strategy are not obvious. Perhaps the Drillco lawyer was unhappy with
how he was doing under a polite format and thought a more adversarial approach would improve his fortunes
(though it is unclear why he would have thought this since the magistrate had favored his position almost every time
there was a dispute). He also may have felt he had lost control of the conversation because the Paine lawyers were
doing more talking; the “bank situation” may have been the first issue about which he had strong feelings; or it just
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sense, it was an aggressiveness test for the Paine lawyers and they accepted the challenge. They
argued that there were “two different banks and a real estate agent involved” in the efforts to
straighten out the mortgage and that each of these parties sent contradictory and confusing
messages to Paine, who was “not a financial wizard” to begin with.91 As such, his understanding
that he had to return to the United States was reasonable under the circumstances. The
magistrate interrupted to ask whether Paine got his mortgage “straightened out when he was up
there in December,” and when the Paine lawyers answered that it was “a little bit unclear,” the
Drillco lawyer renewed his attack with another long soliloquy.92
DA:

Your Honor, I don't think that's unclear at all. I think it goes right to the heart of
this case. He came up here . . . in December and supposedly was going to get this
thing all straightened out. January the 26th, which is over a month after he came
up here and he's long gone back to Venezuela and he's been relieved of his duties
and sent back up here and it's now January the twenty-sixth and the bank is
sending the loan to their attorneys for foreclosure. Payments due: November first,
December first and January first and he did not make those payments even though
he had two thousand dollars, at least, in his account in the Trust Bank, the other
bank that counsel has spoken about.93

Perhaps to prevent another heated exchange, the magistrate asked a series of narrow,
almost rhetorical questions reminiscent of the earlier discussions about Paine’s sub-standard
housing assignment.94 After a few minutes of filling in the blanks in the questions the lawyers
agreed to “let the jury decide” what Paine had done on his trip.95 The topic was dropped and the
conversation moved on to other issues.
The full group meeting ended shortly after this when a magistrate question about what
“[the company supervisors] say [were] the reasons conveyed to them by [Paine] for wanting
vacation time” provoked a sharp disagreement over Paine’s motives for going home.96 The issue
of motives had been discussed earlier, but this was the first time the Drillco lawyer argued his
“home for holidays” theory of the case.97 At the end of this exchange the magistrate concluded
the meeting to caucus privately with each of the individual sides.
DA:

Well, when he talked to [his supervisor] . . . Paine denies that he talked to [his
supervisor], but [the supervisor] will testify that Paine did talk to him and
indicated he was having trouble with his mortgage and he needed to go up and

may have taken him this long to warm up. It is hard to tell from the tape why he changed tactics, but it seems clear
that he did.
91
Id. at 37-38.
92
Id. at 37.
93
Id.
94
The questions were: “. . . weren’t they demanding the full . . . using the acceleration clause?” [sic] “And
they dissolved the deposition on that?” “But it would have to be everything that was due? “But what about how
long he was up there, have we got any evidence as to just what he did while he was up there?” Transcript of Drillco
Pre-Trial Conference at 37-38.
95
Id. at 39.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 40.
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have something, to try to settle it out. But interestingly enough, that this problem
with the mortgage originally came up in mid-October and it was on the
nineteenth of October when Paine had his long-distance conversation with the
fellow at the bank and it's not until late in November when Paine suddenly
decides, gee, I've got to run up there and do something about it. I assume that the
phone in the office still worked back to the United States. He had talked to the
guy at the bank once and I'd like to know and I'm sure the jury will want to know
why the guy didn't go back and pick up the phone and call the bank again and
say “Hey, what's happening?”
PI:

Mr. [Drillco lawyer], I am certain you can appreciate one's concern. You're in a
foreign country, your house may be foreclosed on, there is a substantial
investment that could be lost if they are not there physically present to handle the
matters to straighten them out.

DA:

I appreciate that completely and what I don't understand is when you're there in a
foreign country, you're living in a compound with the people that you work with
and your link to the outside is a telephone in the office of your superintendent and
he has allowed you to use it before and you certainly could assume he would do it
again, why you wouldn't walk or drive across the compound and use that
telephone to call back to the bank to talk to [the bank officer] again, because
you'd had a conversation with him before and [the bank officer] had indicated “I
will talk to your real estate broker, I will talk to the other bank and find out what
the story is for you.” [The bank officer] did that. He wrote a letter on the twentythird of October telling Paine what the story was. If Paine didn't get the letter,
query: why didn't he pick up the phone and call [the bank officer] again and say,
“Hey, I haven't heard from you, what's happening.” Because it's easier to say,
“Gee, I got a problem, Christmas is coming, I want to go home.”

P2:

You know, this idea that they wanted to go home for Christmas . . .

DA:

[Interrupting] Well, they got there at Christmas time, didn't they?

P2:

They got there a week before Christmas, if I am not mistaken. It's true that they
were there during that period. It's also true . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] The first time they've all been away from home, I mean they're
homesick . . .

P2:

Well, that's a motive that is as much a figment of defense counsel's imagination as
anything I've ever seen.

DA:

Yeah, but the difference is I don't have to . . .

P2:

[Interrupting] There's nothing in the record to suggest that that's real.
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DA:

I don't have to prove that that's why he did it. You have to prove that he did it for
discrimination. I can offer that as an alternative to the jury as to perhaps . . . it's
not discrimination. Maybe the guy is lying to him as to why he wants to come up
here. If he's lying about that, he's probably lying about something else.

P2:

Why would somebody want to come home for Christmas when their entire family
is down there with them in the first place, assuming . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] His entire family is homesick.

P2:

Assuming. Well I think that's a little iffy . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] Bring the whole crew home with him. Didn't cost him a nickel did
it?

P2:

Would one jeopardize one's job in order to do that? If, on the contrary . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] Maybe he felt he had more secure tenure.

P2:

Everyone around him was asking permission to go home and being allowed
permission to go, under circumstances involving less emergency than his family
situation, coupled with his mortgage situation . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] Well, is that in fact the case. Can you prove that?

P2:

And he's told . . . well that's been his testimony . . . and he's told when he consults
with [his Venezuelan supervisor], he's told that it may be a little slow during the
last couple of weeks in December, so that he times it at the company's
convenience, rather than his personal convenience for the holidays.

MA:

The bottom line is that it's not a situation where he is footing the bill for all of this
himself. The company is paying the bill for him to come home, paying for his
vacation and paying to fly the whole crew back.

P2:

I'm not sure that's quite accurate, your honor. I think they are paying his airfare,
which in and of itself, furthers my point. They would surely not have done that if
he had left without permission. But, furthermore . . .

DA:

[Interrupting and almost shouting] And they wouldn't have done it if they'd
wanted to discriminate against him, either.98

The discussion continued in this fashion for several minutes, covering such charged
questions as “how in the world the company paid the bill for Paine’s trip if Paine had not gotten
permission,” and whether “Paine’s attitude [was] I don't care whether I've got permission or not,
98

Id. at 39-42.
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I'm going to go.”99 By the end of the discussion relations among the lawyers were strained.
Even in transcript form it is obvious that the exchanges had become longer, more pointed and
more personal than earlier in the meeting and on tape, it is apparent that they also had become
louder and more sarcastic. At times, in fact, the lawyers literally shouted at one another.
Unresponsiveness, interruption and speechmaking, all absent at the outset of the meeting, now
were routine. Neither side seemed interested in listening to or joining issue with the other.100
The magistrate's decision to end the meeting was easy to understand.101
Figuring out why the conversation became so unproductive is not easy. There was no
obvious first cause of the conflict, no single gratuitously insulting or personally offensive
comment that drew first blood and set off a series of self-defensive recriminations. None of the
lawyers had fragile egos or weak personalities and while their areas of practice overlapped, none
was a long-standing competitor of, or had a history or past struggles, with the other. Going into
the conference each of the lawyers expressed respect for the others and while all of them thought
that discussion was likely to be challenging (which it was), they also thought it was likely to be
congenial. None of them had qualms about arguing forcefully for points they believed in, but
neither did they believe that it was productive to argue for the sake of arguing, or to punish
others gratuitously. Each knew that scoring debater's points had the potential to antagonize and
that adversarial histrionics did not play well with this particular magistrate. Yet they turned the
meeting into a form of stylized combat. Why, is hard to understand.
It is possible that the lawyers thought this was the best way to establish their adversary
credentials with the magistrate and thus, the best way to enlist his aid in securing a favorable
settlement. The argument for doing so has a crude logic to it and goes something like this.
Settlement judges will apply pressure to concede where they think it will have the most effect.
Cases which do not settle must go to trial, so pressure to concede will have the greatest effect on
lawyers who are reluctant to go to trial. Lawyers with poor advocacy skills and weak
commitment to their cases will fear trial more than lawyers with good skills and strong
commitment, or at least that’s what judges will think and thus judges will apply greater pressure
to concede on lawyers with poor advocacy skills and weak commitment. Lawyers must prove
that they know how to assess evidence, argue law and stick to their positions, therefore, if they
are to avoid this pressure. If in so doing they risk polarizing conversation, so be it. No one ever
made a good deal by being unwilling to lose it. The argument has weaknesses, of course, but it
99
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also has a certain appeal, particularly to practitioners whose threshold for contentious discussion
is a good deal higher than citizens (or legal academics) generally.102
Whatever the cause, the fact that the lawyers treated the discussion as a kind of
orchestrated fight prevented them from achieving any of the objectives commonly ascribed to the
pre-trial conference.103 They did not narrow the issues in dispute to the serious, contested few,
for example, invent “win-win”104 solutions that accommodated their respective interests and
needs, identify objective criteria against which to measure the strength of their respective claims,
or come to understand and respect the differences between their substantive legal views. They
would have had to listen more carefully to what each other was saying, but listening carefully
was difficult under the circumstances. Many of their comments seemed designed to avoid
unintended, unilateral concessions while buying time to determine how to challenge their
adversary’s position further. The simplest way to avoid conceding is to dismiss statements
peremptorily, planning to return to them once their implications are clear. But having views
dismissed peremptorily can upset others, who will believe, understandably, that they are not
being treated with respect. And if they respond in kind, which would not be unreasonable, it is
not surprising that a fight would break out.
This is the kind of adversarial bargaining that communitarian methods were designed to
replace. Lawyers can hammer out agreements behaving in this way, though the relationship
between the agreements and the parties’ respective substantive rights may often be only
coincidental. But even when they do, they leave interactions of this sort in a foul mood and use
subsequent negotiations to pay other lawyers back for slights and insults, real and perceived. It
would be better if this process could be more social, not only for the psychic health of individual
lawyers but also for the rights of parties and the effectiveness of the dispute settlement system as
a whole. One way to bring this about is to build structural mechanisms into adversarial
bargaining that reduce lawyer defensiveness and posturing and take some of the perceived risk
102

In a variation of this explanation, the Drillco conference lawyers may have believed that if they
expressed tentativeness of any kind the magistrate would compare this unfavorably with the certainty expressed by
the other side and conclude that they were less convinced by their claims. And a lawyer who is less convinced is
less convincing. (Why should I believe you if you don’t believe what you say yourself, especially when you know
things about your case that you’re not telling me?) Yet when asked about this, the lawyers voiced no qualms about
revealing doubt, tentativeness, or limited conviction to the magistrate. They had sophisticated conceptions of
advocacy which saw mixed views as often a sign of strength, and mistrusted the exaggerated expression of certainty
as “protesting too much.” On the other hand, this very sophistication may have worked against them. Each side
made complex arguments that had to be countered. Failing to do so would acknowledge, even if implicitly, that the
arguments had merit, and this would give away important points that could change the magistrate’s understanding of
the case. The lawyers were under simultaneous obligations, therefore, to contest almost every point, but not appear
to be reflexively adversarial, and this is very difficult to do.
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it seems to have meaning for so many people. See Condlin, supra note 12, at 43 n.120 (win-win reminds one of the
Dodo in Alice in Wonderland – “Everybody has won and all must have prizes.”).
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out of acting in a sociable and forthright manner.105 The private caucus is one such mechanism.
Meeting privately with a judge or magistrate permits lawyers to share their intentions and beliefs
candidly and at greater length than would be prudent in the more heated full-group discussion. If
the magistrate reveals their comments for what turn out to be ill-advised reasons, the lawyers are
still in a position to disavow what was said. At least that is how private-caucusing is supposed to
work. Whether reality follows theory is something we will now investigate.
2) First Caucus with the Drillco Lawyer
In what turned out to be perhaps the most fateful move of the conference, the magistrate
decided to meet with the Drillco lawyer first. He had worked extensively with the lawyer in the
past, had just met the Paine lawyers for the first time and thought that starting with a familiar
face would make for a smoother beginning. In a sense he was right, though the decision’s effect
on the settlement agreement itself was less efficacious. The most important objective of a
private caucus is to find out what a party would pay or take to settle. The Drillco lawyer’s
agreement to caucus first, therefore, was the functional equivalent of agreeing to make the first
offer. There is no more fundamental (albeit simpleminded) principle of bargaining practice,
however, than that of not making the first offer. The Drillco lawyer did not have to predict the
Paine lawyers’ demands with precision to know that he was taking a substantial risk in putting a
reasonable figure on the table first. Had the order of the caucuses been reversed and had he
known the Paine lawyers’ demand when he first met with the magistrate, he could have
bargained more aggressively from the outset, but he did not have the benefit of this hindsight
here. This particular sequence of caucuses was not inevitable. Paine was the plaintiff and the
one demanding the change in the status quo. In one sense, it was only logical that he go first and
say what he would take to settle. The seller (in this case, of a legal claim), is always the first to
announce a price. The Drillco lawyer could have argued this to the magistrate but he did not and
eventually he paid for it.
The caucus started innocuously enough. After exchanging pleasantries the magistrate
and the Drillco lawyer discussed, in order, the strength of Paine’s substantive claims, the extent
of his economic damages and the offer Drillco would make. The first of these topics might have
been avoided. Repeating one of his group meeting points, the magistrate began by stating that
the evidence “pretty well [comes] down in Drillco’s favor, unless Mr. Paine gets a pretty quirky
jury;” then he asked “[w]hat kind of authority do you have in this thing?”106 Perhaps taken by
surprise, the Drillco lawyer responded somewhat flippantly, “How much do I need?”107
Seemingly irked by the fact that the lawyer was not willing to “evaluate the case [for
himself],”108 the magistrate spent the next four minutes, or half of the caucus`, making five
separate arguments against Drillco’s position.109 While not vehement or overwhelming, the
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Scott Peppet describes several proposals for constructing such structural features. See Peppet, supra
note 8, at 486-97.
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“Obviously you’ve got some settlement authority. What kind of authority do you have in this thing?”
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 45.
107
Id. at 45.
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“Well that says it all. I mean . . . I don’t know . . . you’re going to have to evaluate the case yourself.”
Id.
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The arguments were: l) “It’s going to cost you a lot of money to prove it . . . .”; 2) “I’m sure Mr. Paine
makes a good appearance. . . .”; 3) “They never had any problems with him before . . . and I think that certainly is a
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arguments were more than perfunctory and collectively they seemed to express doubts about the
magistrate’s earlier statements in support of Drillco. The Drillco lawyer realized almost
immediately that he had made a mistake in not responding directly to the magistrate's question
and tried to interrupt to start the sequence over again,110 but it was too late; he had to defend
himself against each of the magistrate's arguments. Not until he returned to his “Paine lied”
theory of the case did the magistrate let him off the hook, probably because the magistrate did
not believe Paine either.111
After brief asides on the “cost . . . to try this thing,” and the concern that “Mr. Paine will
want to amend the pre-trial order,”112 discussion moved to the subject of Paine’s damages. The
magistrate took the lead. Arguing that Paine “[hadn't] had very good earnings since he left [the]
company,” the magistrate calculated lost back pay [from the lost opportunity to work in
Venezuela], as “maybe one hundred and fifty, one hundred thousand dollars,113 just in the
economics . . . .”114 These figures were larger than they should have been by a factor of almost
six,115 principally because the magistrate counted hardship and overseas bonuses as salary and
failed to take into account that the Venezuelan assignment was for only one year. The Drillco
lawyer saw the mistaken assumptions immediately and in a careful and respectful manner, over a
period of a couple of minutes, explained them to the magistrate.116 Both parties then agreed that
circumstantial indication that this may be the result of some kind of discrimination.”; 4) “If . . . [the supervisor] turns
out to be some kind of racist character, or comes across to the jury like that, you’re sunk.”; and 5) “They really came
down on him pretty hard to fire him, isn’t it [sic].” Id. at 46-47.
110
“Exactly, but . . .” The magistrate interrupted at that point to say: “It’s going to cost you money to prove
it, that’s one thing, and furthermore, it’s the only black fellow that’s worked for the company, and he’s worked his
way up, and I’m sure he makes a good appearance, and I think that’s something that’s going to be taken into
account. I mean they never had any problem with him before until he winds up down there in South America, and I
think that certainly is a circumstantial indication that this may be the result of some kind of discrimination.
Certainly they’ll argue that to the jury.” The Drillco lawyer responded: “Well, sure they will, but Judge, I think that
cuts both ways, because a company that’s going to discriminate against somebody is not – they would have done it
long ago.” And the discussion went off for a couple of minutes on the topic of whether the company discriminated.
Id. at 46.
111
“He is a little squirmy on the deposition, I will grant you that.” Id. at 47.
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The concern that the Paine lawyers might try to amend the pre-trial order to include a claim for noneconomic damages traces back to off-hand comments by the Paine lawyers’ in the full group meeting. While
amendment was never a serious possibility, the risk of it had a major influence on the conference’s outcome.
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The Drillco lawyer will hear this is as a one hundred thousand dollar offer. The magistrate made the
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bargainer always will hear it as the more favorable of the two.
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This is true for only the one hundred and fifty thousand dollar figure. The factor is four if one uses the
one hundred thousand dollar figure.
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DA:
You can’t take those numbers at face value, and the reason is this. He got his base pay,
which was . . . let’s talk about it in terms of months, three thousand dollars a month was his base
pay going down there. He got a hardship bonus and an overseas bonus totaling thirty-five percent
of that. The rest, the difference between what that figure is -- and that comes out to four thousand
and fifty dollars a month -- the difference between that and the six thousand was the bonus for
being in the other country, the difference in exchange rates, the higher prices, and that sort of thing
...
MA:
You mean that’s a wash?
DA:
Which he doesn’t get if he’s not there.
MA:
But he might have stayed there indefinitely if he hadn’t been canned. How long was the
assignment? One year?
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“even so, Paine is about eighteen hundred a month under what he was stateside,” and this “nets
out to somewhere around twenty-seven thousand” in total lost back pay.117 The problem of front
pay was mentioned twice but not discussed because of the difficulty of determining “how long
Mr. Paine will be underemployed.”118 This was a mistake, given the way events were to
develop.
After agreeing on the amount of damages, the magistrate and lawyer turned their
attention to the question of what Drillco would “feel comfortable recommending to close this
thing.”119 This was an important moment in the caucus. Because it was invited by the
magistrate the offer had to be serious, anything less would be insulting and this made it difficult
for the lawyer to suggest a figure that was aggressively, or even plausibly, high.120 The lawyer
began to calculate out loud by explaining that “it's going to cost us at least ten thousand to try it,”
and the magistrate agreed.121 Before he could continue, however, the magistrate interrupted to
describe Drillco’s “exposure [as] probably in the, maybe the top range, seventy-five thousand or
so, maybe a hundred, if they go for . . . if they allow . . . if the judge lets them amend the pre-trial
order . . . .”122 Surprised and perhaps a little confused, the Drillco lawyer acknowledged that
“while I think we've got definitely the upper hand on the case, we've got to allow for the fact that
there is always a risk factor. So I, you know . . . if we can go fifteen thousand, or something.”123
The magistrate accepted this figure instantly and it would become the offer he took back to the
Paine lawyers. In language he would soon repudiate, he stated, “Yeah, that's what I was
thinking. I was thinking in the fifteen to twenty thousand range . . . would probably be a pretty
reasonable settlement.”124 After another brief aside on the question of whether Paine “might be
thinking about cash register numbers,” the magistrate ended the caucus by saying “Well I've got
some idea of what your range is. Let me bring them in here and talk with them a little bit.”125
Fifteen thousand dollars was a surprising first offer for the Drillco lawyer to make. He
had said prior to the conference that fifteen thousand was about as much as he thought Paine
could recover at trial, but once he began the bargaining at that figure there was no possibility he

DA:
MA:
DA:
MA:
Id. at 49.

One year.
Just one year?
A one year assignment.
All right.

117

Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 48.
119
Id. at 50.
120
A plausibly high first offer is the best (from the perspective of the offeror) offer an adverse bargainer
will agree to take the smallest acceptable percentage of the time. As long as there is some possibility, however
small, that the offer will be taken, a lawyer can defend it sincerely and in good faith, in the hope that the present case
is that situation. See Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4
HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 1 (1999) (describing the ideal first offer as one that is as “extreme . . . as can be gotten
away with, but not so extreme that the offeror appears to be negotiating in bad faith”).
121
Id.
122
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 50. This suggests that the magistrate’s earlier concern
about the Paine lawyers increasing Drillco’s exposure by amending the pre-trial order was having an effect.
123
Id. at 51.
124
Id.
125
Id.
118

27

would end there.126 He might have changed his mind about expected outcome, of course, but
since almost everything had gone his way in the conference up until then it is not clear why he
would have. The reasons he gave for making a fifteen thousand dollar offer also were curious.127
He explained the offer as a combination of the ten thousand dollars saved if the case was not
tried and five thousand dollars to compensate Paine for his expected chance of success at trial.128
But why he would offer Paine both the results of a successful trial and the savings realized from
not having to go to trial, is not clear. Paine would save his own costs in avoiding trial and
without the same inducement it is not clear why Drillco would want to settle. If the Drillco
lawyer’s prediction about trial outcome was wrong and there was a risk Drillco would have to
pay Paine more than five thousand dollars, the company still had no reason to offer Paine the ten
thousand dollars saved by avoiding trial. There was no necessary correlation between an
increased risk of losing at trial and the cost of trying the case. Such a risk might justify an offer
of more than five thousand dollars but if so, the size of the offer would depend upon the
percentage increase in the risk of losing, not the cost of trial. In effect, the Drillco lawyer bid
against himself here by making two offers instead of one and both his second offer (the savings
realized by avoiding trial), and the combination of the two, were unduly generous.
Perhaps the combination of Paine wanting “cash register numbers,” the magistrate’s
mistaken estimate of Drillco’s exposure (as seventy-five to one hundred thousand dollars), and
the Paine lawyers’ possible threat to amend the pretrial order to ask for non-economic
damages,129 spooked the Drillco lawyer and pushed him to his bottom line prematurely. The
fifteen thousand dollar offer was made quickly, without much explanation and in response to the
magistrate's first serious application of pressure. But if the Drillco lawyer panicked this would
be surprising. He was an experienced bargainer (and litigator), and not likely to make an
impulsive, ill-considered offer. Instead, he may have interpreted the magistrate's request for a
offer as a directive to get right to the point and not waste time bargaining. He knew the
magistrate well, had worked with him extensively in the past and trusted him not to take
advantage. Perhaps he spoke more candidly about the case than he would have otherwise
because of these factors. In other words, the fifteen thousand dollar offer may have been a
truthful (and communitarian) response to the question of how much authority he had and not a
bargaining move.
Being candid with the magistrate made sense, however, only if the Paine lawyers would
be candid in return and this was a questionable assumption to make. The Paine lawyers had
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disclosed little if any private information unilaterally in the full group meeting, for example, had
argued both large and small issues aggressively and had made exaggerated demands, often
causing the magistrate to appear to have second thoughts about his initial Drillco-favoring views.
The lesson of the full group meeting,130 as far as the Drillco lawyer was concerned, should have
been that the Paine lawyers were aggressive, maximizing bargainers and that there was
considerable risk in exposing his true bottom line to them unilaterally, (even if through the
magistrate).131 Admittedly, this risk would have been easier to appreciate had the order of the
caucuses been reversed. No doubt, the Drillco lawyer would have changed his approach had the
Paine lawyers’ demand been on the table before he made his own first offer. But given the Paine
lawyers’ strategy waiting in the wings, we now know that the negotiation was almost over after
the first Drillco caucus. On the surface, however, things looked just the opposite and the Drillco
lawyer had every reason to be optimistic. Apart from having to re-argue part of the case on the
merits, the meeting seemed to have gone very well. The magistrate had agreed that the evidence
“came down in Drillco's favor,” and also had evaluated the case for settlement in a dollar amount
nearly identical to Drillco’s.132 While he might have to come up with another five thousand
dollars or so,133 the Drillco lawyer could have expected that he would be able to settle on
satisfactory terms. All that remained was to bring the Paine lawyers on board and with the
magistrate as his ally that ought to be easy to do.
3) First Caucus with Paine’s Lawyers
In their first caucus the Paine lawyers changed the magistrate's view of the case and laid
the groundwork for a settlement that went well beyond what he and the Drillco lawyer had
agreed was “pretty reasonable.”134 The caucus illustrates how bargaining skill can combine with
fortuity to confound even settled beliefs and expectations. The caucus lasted nearly twice as
long as the Drillco caucus and was an equal mix of advocacy and trading.135 Offers were
requested, made, attacked, defended and refined and the substantive issues in contention,
including those already discussed, were debated at length. The discussion was fast paced,
confrontational and intense, but also respectful, substantively sophisticated and logically ordered.
It is a good illustration of how even lively argument can advance understanding and produce
agreement.
The magistrate began by asking the Paine lawyers “what kind of authority” they had to
130
Paine’s lawyers were new to the community and from another region of the country. As a result, the
Drillco lawyer had no past experience with them, or local, reputational information about how they would bargain.
His observations from the full group meeting were all he had to go on.
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It does not matter whether the Paine lawyers’ aggressiveness was a defensive reaction to the Drillco
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kind, if only to neutralize the effects of their approach. This also should have been the lesson the Paine lawyers
drew about the Drillco lawyer and they did.
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settle, but as he explained, he meant “are you all pretty well in the driver's seat or is the client
calling the shots?”136 Put in this way, the question asked whether Paine was greedy and out of
control more than how counsel evaluated the case for settlement and as such, it probably
reflected the magistrate’s continuing concern about Paine wanting “cash register numbers.”137
The lawyers’ answer, that they “were fairly well in the driver's seat, with some parameters,”
seemed to invite the follow up question of what they wanted to settle, but the magistrate did not
ask that question for some time to come.138 Instead, also repeating an earlier point, he
challenged the strength of Paine’s claim on the merits, arguing at length and in several different
ways, that Paine was “going to have a hard time“ proving discrimination.139 These arguments
were important, not so much for what they said, they contained little that was new,140 but for the
overall impression they conveyed of the magistrate solidly on the side of Drillco. These opening
comments seemed to give the Paine lawyers little reason to be hopeful.
About four minutes into the caucus the magistrate asked the second version of the
question with which he had begun: “Well, how do you evaluate the case for settlement purposes?
What kind of number have you come up with?”141 While not as flippant,142 initially the Paine
lawyers were as hesitant as the Drillco lawyer to put a specific dollar figure on the table.
Building up to an offer, they pointed out that Paine’s monetary demands depended upon
“whether he got make-whole Title VII relief, including reinstatement, or whether all he [got was]
money.”143 The magistrate interrupted, ostensibly to identify “another problem”144 with Paine’s
136

Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 52.
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141
Id. at 55.
142
See discussion supra Part III.2.
143
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 56. This was the first mention of reinstatement in the
conference. It had not been discussed in the full group meeting and was not mentioned in the pre-trial order.
137

30

case, but probably to give himself time to digest this new demand for reinstatement. Following a
brief, pro forma discussion of the diversionary problem, he returned to the reinstatement issue by
saying, “anyway, go ahead on to . . . you talked about the ways you have evaluated the case . . .
go ahead, I interrupted you.”145
Here, the Paine lawyers made their first formal offer. It was probably the most important
move of the caucus.
P2:

I was just going to suggest that we thought a suitable settlement . . . on the one
hand, if the employer is willing to reinstate Mr. Paine and if they are, we think it’s
in both Mr. Paine’s interest and the employer's interest . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] Well, does he want it?

P2:

Yes sir.

MA:

He does want it?

P2:

Yes sir. If you look at what he has lost in earnings, in future job status and
earning potential, by leaving this situation where he was a long-seniority
supervisor with a high earning potential and high status . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] Well then, as a bottom line, how much money are you talking about
if they reinstate him?

P2:

We're talking about one hundred thousand dollars, plus reinstatement, plus
clearing his record.

MA:

No way. No way. There's no way. It's just not possible. I wouldn't evaluate it
with reinstatement at one hundred thousand dollars, even without, frankly. I don't
think they'll reinstate him because they are convinced he lied and I think that
practically is not practical.

P2:

Do you think they are really convinced he lied, or that they're just backing up [the
company supervisor] as a matter of face saving?

MA:

Who? . . . . Didn't [Drillco's house counsel] do the investigation as an independent
...

P2:

[Another company officer] did the investigation. [This officer] is the one person

144

“Here’s another problem that I see . . . . on all the . . . claims [other than Title VII] that you’ve got
milling around here . . . I don’t know how many of them will survive a directed verdict frankly,” and on those that
do, the Court “may not ask the jury to find damages at all, is that clear?” Id. Throughout the conference the
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arguments to support their positions, seemingly to control the flow of new information and consider it at his own
speed.
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Mr. Paine had bad blood with. It's very peculiar that he was picked to do the
investigation under those circumstances.
P1:

Yes.

MA:

Didn't they send somebody else down there to investigate

P1:

The statement indicates that under [the company officer with whom Paine had bad
blood], that when Mr. Paine was returned to the United States he conducted an
investigation into Venezuela events. I'm attributing that to [the officer]. He had
been Mr. Paine’s supervisor. Now, “conducted” sounds like he actually did it.
Whether he undertook to see that the investigation was made . . .146

This demand changed the negotiation radically. To begin with, it introduced the new
remedy of reinstatement. Paine’s pleadings did not request reinstatement, there was no mention
of it in the pretrial order and it had not been discussed in the full group meeting. Yet,
reinstatement had a lot to recommend it. Drillco was a large company with facilities throughout
the United States and while Paine’s former job had been filled, equivalent positions were vacant
at many of the company’s other refineries. As a practical matter, reinstatement was a workable
option. But more importantly, if successful, it would eliminate the need to speculate about
Paine’s lost front-pay because there would be none and this would remove the thorniest damage
issue from the case. Properly understood, reinstatement provided a possible “win-win”147
response to what otherwise had the potential to be a zero-sum problem and allowed the
magistrate to avoid the unpleasant task of having to choose between either-or (front pay/no front
pay) options.
But reinstatement also had its downside. It was a new and complicated item, its strategic
implications were unknown and it was introduced at a time when there was already a lot of water
over the dam. Adding it to the settlement package might require re-negotiating the preliminary
agreement with the Drillco lawyer after he had agreed to what he was told were reasonable
terms. He might view such a move as low-balling,148 conclude that he could not trust the
magistrate, rescind his original offer and break-off negotiations altogether. Reinstatement also
might conflict with the provisions of Drillco’s collective bargaining agreement with its union, or
cause morale problems with other Drillco employees over whom Paine was promoted. If the
magistrate thought these or other such risks were substantial it is understandable that he would
be unsympathetic to the request for reinstatement. Given this backdrop, the Paine lawyers had to
be encouraged by the magistrate's somewhat tepid response.149
146

Id. at 57-58.
See supra note 104.
148
CHESTER L. KARRASS, GIVE & TAKE 105-07 (1974) (describing “lowballing: the attractive offer that
turns out not so attractive”).
149
While the magistrate might have said there was “no way” Paine could be reinstated (it is not clear
whether “no way” refers to the demand for one hundred thousand dollars or the demand for reinstatement), he also
asked if Paine “want[ed] it (i.e., reinstatement),” and “how much money” he wanted “if” reinstatement was granted.
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 57. These questions were unnecessary if there was truly “no way”
reinstatement could be granted. He also qualified the “no way” assertion itself four sentences later when he said “I
don’t think they’ll reinstate him because they are convinced he lied.” Id. Finally, while “no way” is strong and
147
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The reinstatement demand also was noteworthy for the different understanding of the pretrial conference and the different approach to bargaining, that it reflected. The Drillco lawyer’s
offer of fifteen thousand dollars was a genuine bottom-line figure that left little room for further
negotiation. It was what he hoped to pay to settle the lawsuit and was designed to end the
bargaining process as much as start it. It did not contemplate much in the way of further
concessions. The Paine lawyers’ request for reinstatement plus one hundred thousand dollars, on
the other hand, was the proverbial inflated, opening demand. It asked for more than Paine
reasonably could have hoped to win even if completely successful at trial and left plenty of room
for future concessions. It pushed one end of the bargaining range150 out as far as possible, in an
attempt to define the range in terms that were imbalanced in Paine’s favor.151 In old fashioned
terminology, the Paine lawyers were “maximizers,” and the Drillco lawyer was a “fair and
reasonable” bargainer. In a one-time relationship, maximizers usually beat fair and reasonable
bargainers and they would again here.
The defense of a demand and not its size, is what gives it force, however, and the Paine
lawyers’ defense was skillful. They expressed the demand calmly and matter-of-factly, not
arguing for it before it was challenged and when challenged, not filibustering with long
soliloquies that delayed or prevented the magistrate’s reaction. These latter tactics signal a
defensiveness that undercuts any attempt to be convincing.152 When the magistrate said “no
way,” and seemed to reject the demand out of hand, the Paine lawyers ignored that statement and
responded instead to the easier-to-rebut claim that Paine had lied.153 There was no look of panic
on their faces, no nervousness in their tone. Their voices did not rise and their pace did not
speed up. They acted as if nothing particularly significant had happened and stood ready to
discuss the demand, as if they expected the magistrate to agree with it once he came to
understand it. In short, they looked like people who believed in what they had asked for and who
thought that the magistrate would come to believe in it also. In the discussion that followed, not
particularly noteworthy in its own right, one could see the intensity of the magistrate's resistance
unequivocal, the tone with which it was said was not. The magistrate raised his voice and increased his pace only
slightly, and looked more surprised than angry. He seemed to be saying, “I don’t want to hear this,” rather than “I
have already thought about what you say and have rejected it.”
150
Condlin, supra note 7, at 68 (describing concept of bargaining range). See also Korobkin, supra note 3,
at (describing the concept of “bargaining zone”).
151
Parties typically split a bargaining range somewhat evenly once it has been identified. Winning and
losing is obvious otherwise and this always will be unacceptable to one of the parties. Thus, it is easier (though not
easy) to construct an imbalanced range in the first instance than it is to bargain for a disproportionate share of a fair
range once constructed and maximizing bargainers try to do this. See Id., at (describing the process of
constructing the bargaining range as “zone definition”); RAIFFA, supra note 42, at 47-50 (illustrating the relationship
between concession pattern and bargaining range). It is not enough just to make up inflated demands, however, one
also must successfully challenge an adversary’s efforts to do the same thing in response and successfully defend
one’s own demands. A demand becomes a serious offer only when arguments in support of it convince an adversary
that there is some possibility one will refuse to settle unless the demand is met. In this way, successful trading
always is a corollary of successful advocacy.
152
Arguing for a point before it has been challenged evidences a defensiveness that can undercut
credibility. A listener might wonder, privately of course, why he/she should believe the point if the speaker feels the
need to defend it before it is clear that anyone disagrees. Solid arguments are expected to hold up under scrutiny
and persons making them do not try to pre-empt attempts to challenge them. They realize that listeners are more
easily convinced by the give and take that follows a challenge than by a lecture.
153
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 57.
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begin to ebb.154
The discussion reached an impasse on this point, so the magistrate shifted gears and
asked, “On the basis that they are not willing to reinstate him, what . . . how do you evaluate
it?”155 Paine’s lawyers replied, “We double the monetary figure.”156 This seemed to startle the
magistrate, as he asked, incredulously, “And that's for settlement, or maximum award?”157 The
liveliest discussion of the caucus followed. More agitated than at any other time in the entire
conference, the magistrate attacked this escalation move158 in several ways. At first, he asked the
lawyers how they justified doubling their demand.
P2:

That's for settlement. Let me . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] Two hundred thousand?

P2:

It seems to me, your honor, we're talking about a differential per month of
eighteen hundred dollars right now and we ignore inflation and all of those things
...

MA:

[Interrupting] What's to say that tomorrow he won't get . . .

P2:

. . . and this is a gentleman in his thirties . . . he's got another thirty years of
working life.

MA:

He doesn't have another thirty years of working at a low salary job. You can't
base this on speculation.

P2:

Well, you certainly can't base it on the speculation that in this job market he's
going to find a comparable . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] He's also got a duty to mitigate.

P2:

Well, he is mitigating. That's why it's only two thousand a month, not three
thousand a month.

MA:

Well, what authority have you got . . .

P2:

[Interrupting] That doesn't even include fringe benefits. We threw that by the
wayside as part of our settlement offer.
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The fact that the magistrate once thought Paine’s back-pay damages were in the vicinity of one hundred
thousand dollars and that such an award was still possible if Paine was allowed to amend the pre-trial order, might
have made the offer seem less shocking than it should have. See discussion supra Part III.2.
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Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 58.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Literally, the magistrate challenged the two hundred thousand dollar demand and not the fact that the
lawyers made an escalation move. See KARRASS, supra note 149, at 60-62 (describing “escalation tactics”). But see
Bazerman, supra note 10, at (describing “The Nonrational Escalation of Conflict”).
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MA:

That's awful nice of you.159 What kind of authority . . . what do you have that
says that the front pay in these Title VII situations, or under nineteen eighty-one,
goes on for the rest of his working life?

P2:

Well, your honor, there are not a lot of Title VII . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] It's not a personal injury kind of thing.

P2:

No.

MA:

[Interrupting] Where you've got diminished earning capacity.

P2:

Well, your honor, there are not a lot of Title VII cases where indeed the ordinary,
usual customary and generally mandatory remedy of reinstatement is denied, or . .
.

MA:

[Interrupting] Oh, there are zillions of them . . .

P2:

[Interrupting] No actually, there . . .

MA:

. . . where they don't want to be reinstated.

P2:

There are relatively few and there's a great body of case law that says that the
make-whole, ordinary, preferred remedy is reinstatement.

MA:

That's right.

P2:

In the unusual cases, there is always the question of the jobs that they have found.
A great many of them find jobs during the pendency of the case that eliminates
the problem of the likelihood that they will be permanently in a lower tier
position. The cases I am most familiar with where that is not true are not Title
VII cases, but age discrimination cases, which is, after all . . . 160

Using an age discrimination analogy as a justification for the inflated demand seemed to
surprise the magistrate. The Paine lawyers had not made such an argument anytime in the case
up until then and thus, there was no reason for the magistrate to have read age discrimination
cases in preparing for the conference. After a one-line response, that age discrimination cases
were different “because nobody get younger,”161 the magistrate abandoned the topic by agreeing
159

Ironically, this sarcasm was a positive sign. The magistrate’s ability to joke about the situation
indicated that he had not been pushed beyond his limits. He was not really mad, in other words, though he was
irked, and this meant that Paine’s lawyers could continue to press him. Cf. Allred, et al., supra note 101, at
(describing the nature of genuine anger in negotiation); Morris, supra note 101, at (same).
160
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 58-59.
161
Id. at 60. In fairness to the magistrate, there was a brief discussion of the analogy, but “nobody gets
younger” seemed to be his only substantive point. The discussion is set out in its entirety below.
P2:
Yes, but age discrimination act cases are brought under a statute modeled under Title VII, whose
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that “it [the age discrimination analogy] is worth a little bit in terms of the front pay kind of
remedy,” as long as Drillco does not have “to foot the bill . . . for the rest of [Mr. Paine’s]
life.”162 The Paine lawyers accepted this half-way concession and dropped the argument. In
retrospect, they might have pushed the point a little further, but going into the conference they
did not think the age discrimination analogy was strong and had planned to abandon it in the face
of any substantial resistance. At the time, they were more than happy to accept the concession of
it being worth “a little bit” in return for not pressing the argument.
The Paine lawyers then turned the discussion to another “body of precedent” that they
argued also authorized front pay damages. It consisted of the “great many cases where
reinstatement . . . isn't possible immediately and may not be possible for two years, or five years,
or ten years.”163 In such cases, they argued, “the typical make-whole . . . order” requires a
defendant to “reinstate as soon as possible and in between now and then pay the differential [in
salary], whatever that differential may be.”164 Paine’s situation was not different in any
significant respect from the delayed full employment case, the lawyers argued and thus the same
kind of order could be entered here. At this point, the magistrate may have blinked slightly.
Perhaps concerned about the growing number of “bodies of precedent” the Paine lawyers were
able to muster and that he was not prepared to discuss, he acknowledged, albeit indirectly, that
reinstatement might be a possibility.165 Compared with its increasingly unattractive alternatives,
it no longer looked so bad.
The Paine lawyers then reversed roles on the magistrate, asking, “Well, your honor, how

MA:

P2:
MA:
P2:
MA:
P2:
MA:
P2:
Id. at 60.

prohibitory language is identical to Title VII, and the situation arises more commonly there
because when they get reduced out in force their chances of getting employed elsewhere are often
demonstrably very slim. And the usual . . .
[Interrupting] Well, that’s true, but the whole idea is they’re being fired because they’re too old to
work, according to the employer. The reason they are being fired is because they are too old to fit
the employer’s needs, and Congress has said that’s unlawful, but if that’s the case, their
employability is diminished. And I don’t see anything in this case that says that Mr. Paine can’t
go out next month get a job that pays what he had.
Actually, your honor, I hesitate to correct your last statement, but they’re fired because the
employer thinks they are too old.
That’s what I said.
They don’t necessarily . . . but they don’t necessarily think that they are too old.
Right. I understand that.
They may very well not be too old to perform.
I understand.
And the reason that their employability prospects are diminished is that there is rampant age
discrimination elsewhere in this society rather than that there is any real impairment in terms of
their capability.
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Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 61.
164
Id.
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This time he made no attempt to respond substantively to the Paine lawyers’ argument. His actual
words were, “Well, let me make this clear. I haven’t broached the reinstatement idea by [sic] [the Drillco lawyer]
and maybe he’d be more receptive to that than I judge he would be. I don’t know. It seems to me they’re a little bit
vituperative here in terms of they don’t want anything to do with Mr. Paine. They don’t like him because they think
he lied.” Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 61.
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36

do you see this thing in terms of settling?”166 The move was timely. In a long, sometimes
rambling and often disjointed response, the magistrate expressed a set of contradictory
commitments and beliefs that revealed a person beginning to have doubts about his evaluation of
the case and perhaps beginning to change his mind.
MA:

Well, I don't know. I think it probably has a . . . I've got some idea what [the
Drillco lawyer’s] line of authority is. I think he probably is coming in telling me
a little low. The company realizes that it's going to be out-of-pocket a certain
amount to try the case to begin with, so that's already in the loss column and they
think that there's some prospect that you could recover if you get a sympathetic
jury, sympathetic to your client and convince them that everybody else is lying.
This is an uphill struggle. You know that. A plaintiff's always got that problem.
I think, and I've got to tell you, I think the facts come down more on the
company's side than on your side in this case. I don't see any smoking gun. I
don't see any real hard evidence. It's entirely circumstantial, proof of intent. And
the independent witness . . . does not really corroborate your guy. The thing
about the mother-in-law and varicose veins, if that's an emergency, I don't know.
Can you bring some doctor in here who will testify as to the life-threatening
nature of varicose-veins? I think you'll have a hard time finding one.167

The Drillco lawyer would have been surprised to learn that the magistrate thought he
“[was] coming in. . . a little low.”168 In the first caucus, the same magistrate described the
lawyer’s fifteen thousand dollar offer, which took both the “amount to try the case” and the
“prospect . . . [of recovery from] a sympathetic jury” into account, as “pretty reasonable.”169 In
fact, it was the dollar value the magistrate had in mind himself. Yet, now he was beginning to
have second thoughts. While he had not yet changed his mind completely and still believed that
“"the facts come down more on the company's side than on Paine’s,”170 the magistrate’s
conviction had begun to weaken.
A moderately long but only semi-serious discussion of “the life-threatening nature of
varicose vein” surgery followed,171 at the end of which the magistrate made another interesting
comment.
MA:

In any event, you've got a tough time convincing the jury of this. Not to say that

166

Id. at 62.
Id. at 62-63.
168
Id at 62. If “little” is read to mean five thousand dollars then nothing has changed. In the first caucus,
the magistrate characterized the Drillco lawyer’s fifteen thousand dollar offer as a fifteen to twenty thousand dollar
offer and thus signaled that it would have to be increased by five thousand dollars. See discussion supra Part III.2.
But in the present context the magistrate seemed to be saying that the Drillco lawyer may have to re-evaluate the
case in its entirety, that if Paine got a sympathetic jury the lawyer’s understanding of what the case was worth was
fundamentally mistaken.
169
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 51, 52.
170
See discussion supra Part III.2.
171
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 63. Recall that one of the reasons Paine gave for returning
to the United States was to assist his mother-in-law during the period of her varicose vein surgery. The legal
question was whether the surgery was an “emergency” within the terms of the Drillco employee handbook and thus
an authorized reason to leave.
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your advocacy won't do the trick,172 but I see this as more likely than not a
defendant’s verdict and that diminishes the settlement value the case . . . . I think,
if I push [the Drillco lawyer], this is above the line of authority he has given me, I
think maybe he can come up with thirty thousand dollars, maybe somewhere in
that ballpark, but I don't think you're going to get anything higher than that. And
I'd have to push him to come up with that. This, after your fee is deducted, would
give . . . 173
This was the second time in the caucus that the magistrate acknowledged, albeit
indirectly, that Paine might win at trial, this time because of the Paine lawyers’ advocacy skills.
Ordinarily, a comment praising lawyer advocacy skill would be just so much stroking, but the
magistrate started the conference never having met the Paine lawyers and the comment praising
their skill had to be based on what he had seen in the conference itself. Seen in this light, the
comment seemed to signal a weakening of the magistrate’s resolve and encouraged the Paine
lawyers to press for more. More significantly, the magistrate also put a number on his changing
evaluation of the case, in effect, by offering the lawyers thirty thousand dollars174 to settle. This
was less than they had asked for to be sure, but twice as much as what he had told the Drillco
lawyer he thought was reasonable. The magistrate had started to negotiate (in the sense of trade
proposals) with the lawyers and as with all trading, the relevant question was where he would
stop. The ensuing discussion provided more clues.
PI:

This is without reinstatement?

MA:

Oh, yeah, without reinstatement . . .

P2:

[Interrupting] Let me add another item . . . . I should add a couple . . .

MA:

. . . it would give Mr. Paine some money in his pocket. That may be enough to
assuage his feelings. I assume you're taking a quarter or a third, so he would wind
up with maybe twenty thousand or so, or maybe a little more than that on a
contingent basis . . .

P2:

[Interrupting] Your honor, I should have said a couple of other things . . .

MA:

. . . but if you're talking in the big ticket, if you're talking about, if you're stuck at
one hundred thousand dollars, or even anything above fifty, I think you might as
well forget it. There's no way . . .

172

This comment about advocacy skills made explicit what had been apparent for some time in the
conference. The Paine lawyers consistently made clever arguments the magistrate did not anticipate, told him about
case law he was not aware of and argued at a level of sophistication slightly beyond his in discussing individual
legal points. Their arguments were one frame of reference ahead of the magistrate much of the time. This was not
surprising given the differences in role between advocate and magistrate but it also could not help but cause a bright
person such as the magistrate to develop a respect, even if grudging, for the lawyers’ skill.
173
Id. at 64.
174
Literally, he offered to try to convince the Drillco lawyer to make an offer of thirty thousand dollars but
both the magistrate and the Paine Lawyers assumed that the Drillco lawyer would go along.

38

P2:

[Interrupting] Let me mention a couple . . .

MA:

. . . I'll stand and fight.175

While ostensibly still opposed to reinstatement (“Oh yeah, without reinstatement”), the
magistrate’s protestations now had begun to ring increasingly hollow. He was protesting too
much. He discussed reinstatement at length, hinted that the Drillco lawyer might accept it and
did not explain why it would not work. All of this indicated that he took the option seriously, his
comments to the contrary notwithstanding. His objections may have been sincere but they were
not plausible and the Paine lawyers were right to ignore them. The lawyers responded with a
variation of their escalation strategy.176 Each time the magistrate resisted their demands they
added, or threatened to add, another item or argument to the bargaining agenda (“Let me add
another item . . . . I should add a couple of . . . ;” “Your honor, I should have said a couple of
other things . . . ,” “Let me mention a couple of . . . ”). The message, that new issues would keep
appearing until he saw things their way, could not have been one the magistrate wanted to
hear.177 His only choices were to flee (concede) or fight (argue), and since his arguments until
then had not been all that effective, fleeing was beginning to look like the better option. Fleeing
meant buying his way out of the discussion in the same manner he bought his way out of the
similarly unsuccessful earlier discussions, by making a more generous offer.
The foregoing exchange contains an important clue as to the magistrate's private
monetary evaluation of the case. While he told the Drillco lawyer he thought the case was worth
fifteen to twenty thousand dollars and the Paine lawyers that he thought he could get them thirty
thousand, here he indicated that a “big ticket” demand would be “anything above fifty thousand
dollars.”178 Given his fear that the pre-trial order would be amended and the issues in the case
expanded, fifty thousand dollars was not out of line as a value to place on the case. The Paine
lawyers did not pick up on this clue, however, and the magistrate did not mention the fifty
thousand dollar figure again. The lawyers’ failure to get a commitment to fifty thousand dollars
would have repercussions in the next caucus when the magistrate presented Paine’s counter
proposal to the Drillco lawyer. It was the Paine lawyers’ only serious error in the caucus.
Conversation then shifted to the attorney’s fees issue mentioned by the magistrate earlier
in the caucus and the Paine lawyers proceeded to argue that it was not proper to negotiate for
fees “in conjunction with settlement.”179 The magistrate objected, arguing that “[the Drillco
lawyer] has got to know . . . the bottom line cost," otherwise he "is not going to settle.”180 A
moderately long discussion of this issue ended only when the Paine lawyers pointed out that they
“were really talking about a relatively modest amount . . . five thousand all in.”181 This
discussion lacked the fast-paced and confrontational qualities of the caucus until then, as each
side seemed to be catching its breath and gearing up for the finish. Though the participants could
175

Id. at 64-65.
See discussion supra Part III.3.
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That he kept interrupting the lawyers to cut them off before they could make the arguments is the best
evidence of this.
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Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 65.
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not have known it at the time, this topic was to be to the caucus what a turnaround point is to an
out-and-back road race. As the last new substantive issue to be discussed, it completed the list of
obstacles needed to be overcome in reaching an agreement. All of the contested issues now were
on the table and it remained only for the parties to figure out how to compromise and converge.
At first, each side dug in its heels, sometimes arguing, sometimes inviting an offer, sometimes
making one, as if in an elaborate game of chicken.182 Each seemed to be testing the other’s will
and stamina, professing unwavering support for its own positions while scrutinizing the other’s
for signs of tentativeness or doubt. Yet, slowly, as the discussion wound on, each side also
began to express flexibility and a willingness to compromise. These contradictory signals made
the conversation complicated and subtle and an interesting study in endgame bargaining.
The following exchange is an illustration of this endgame bargaining, blending features
of advocacy, concession and convergence into one seamless whole. The magistrate spoke first.
MA:

Alright. Well, that [i.e., attorneys fees] might be something that can be worked
out with him [the Drillco lawyer]. But in terms of the money going to your client,
where do you think the settlement value is in the big number range?

P2:

We're willing to talk about these numbers, but I'm telling you what we . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] Well, I'm telling you I think that given the way this thing lines up,
now obviously I haven't seen Mr. Paine, or [his company supervisor] or anybody
else, so I don't have an idea about really how they're going to come across in
terms of credibility and demeanor, but on the other hand, you all haven't seen
anybody except your client and [the bank officer]. So you're going to be shooting
in the dark.

P2:

Often, plaintiff's counsel finds themselves in that position.

MA:

Well, that happens sometimes, that's right, but I mean that's something that
obviously is a weakness that doesn't add to the strength of your negotiating
position. Well, suppose you realistically, suppose the ceiling on recovery going
to Mr. Paine himself is about twenty-five thousand.183 That would leave enough
room to pay you attorneys fees and still keep it within what the company can
stomach. How do you feel about that?

P2:

Hardly pay us to settle.

MA:

Why?

P2:

Unless we're talking about reinstating Mr. Paine. Obviously his injury here, I
mean he lost forty thousand off the top just in being sent back and not being able
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See WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA 197-201 (1992) (describing bargaining game of

chicken).

183

This seems to be a restatement of the magistrate’s thirty thousand dollar offer. The Paine lawyers had
said earlier in the caucus that their fee would be five thousand dollars.
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to complete that term in Venezuela, never mind his future prospects.
MA:

Now wait a minute! I don't know about that. Now wait just a minute. There's a
cost-of-living type thing in there, you're talking about gross numbers. His net out
of that is much less. Isn't it?

P2:

No, I don't think so. I think we can play with the numbers in various ways . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] His net is probably in the twenties somewhere.

P2:

Well, there's a lot of numbers . . .

MA:

But then at settlement, you're not, I mean, you guys are talking the top of the
maximum recovery and settlement has got to take into account the very real
possibility that he'll get zip . . .

P2:

[Interrupting] Of course. Agreed, your Honor. On the other hand, we're talking
also about compensatory damages, about lost fringe benefits . . .

MA:

. . . and if he gets zip I don't know what you get. I'll bet if he gets zip you don't
get anything out of the civil rights act.

P2:

Well, but on the other hand, bear in mind what our losses are. They are maxed
out at what our gains are in attorneys’ fees and costs if we prevail. Our
investment may very well be not so great that it doesn't make sense for us to
throw in another thirty hours and try the case.

MA:

Certainly, everything is a cost benefit kind of thing, but I mean, you know, the
point is, that you've got to realize and you can't realistically, I know you're
advocates, but in terms of the settlement process, you've got to realistically look at
the case and realistically, you've got an uphill battle of proving intent by way of
circumstantial evidence, where at least two of the people you claim are lying are,
let's say, non-American, Caucasian racial group, which is a real hassle for you in
this case.184

Unlike earlier discussions where argument predominated, here offer making and
argument were mixed in nearly equal proportions. The argument was fairly perfunctory,
consisting for the most part of the magistrate saying “take seriously the possibility that you might
not win,” and Paine’s lawyers countering with “what more do we have to lose.” These were not
new points and at times each side looked as if it was giving directions to a non-native speaker,
“saying it again, louder.” But the statements also contained an important subliminal message.
When the Paine lawyers said “we're willing to talk about these numbers,” it would “hardly pay
us to settle . . . unless we're talking about reinstate[ment],” we could “. . . play with the numbers
in various ways," and we “agree” that Paine could “get zip,” they communicated an openmindedness about the magistrate’s proposals, a realistic understanding of the situation and a
184
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willingness to compromise.185 While the literal content of their comments was mixed, the
underlying point was clear. They were willing to settle.
The magistrate did not seem to pick up on the subliminal message right away, or if he
did, he was not quick to acknowledge it. He responded to the lawyers’ comments as if they
reflected intransigence rather than flexibility and four times within a single sentence appealed to
them to be “realistic.” Appeal is the least effective of the negotiation advocacy strategies, 186 and
it is rare to see an experienced bargainer use it at all.187 But here it may have been just the right
move. After a brief aside on whether the Venezuelan supervisors would be believed,188 and
185

Id. at 67.
Bargaining advocacy takes the form of argument, threat and appeal and the three strategies are preferred
in that order. See Condlin, supra note 7, at 69-70 (describing advocacy strategies in bargaining). By asking for a
favor, an appeal tacitly concedes the point under discussion and asks for mercy from the adversary (like an animal in
nature confronted by a more powerful enemy, the person goes “belly up”). Resorting to appeal is a situation most
bargainers try to avoid.
187
An appeal is not necessarily a strategy of helplessness when used by a magistrate. A magistrate is not
an adversary in the traditional sense and when he asks a lawyer to be “realistic” he does so from a public officer
rather than interested party point of view. More importantly, if a lawyer does not respond, a magistrate will have the
opportunity to pay him back, so to speak, from a position of power many times over during the course of the case
(and a career). There is a tacit threat in a magistrate’s request for a favor, therefore, that is not present when another
lawyer does the asking.
188
Like all topics raised at this stage of the caucus, this issue had been discussed earlier and nothing new
was added this time around.
186

P2:
MA:
P2:

I don’t think it’s that hard to get the jury to believe . . .
[Interrupting] It’s not like the typical big corporation where a whole . . .
. . . that two poor Venezuelans who managed to luck into a job with a big American company are
very fearful of being shipped back into . . .
MA:
Suppose both have MSEE degrees.
P2:
Is there anything in the record that says that?
MA:
You haven’t deposed them. Suppose they are Ph.D.’s. You don’t know.
P2:
Well, but we do know. They wouldn’t be operating at the level of Mr. Paine’s immediate
supervisors if that’s what their credentials were.
MA:
You never know. Maybe they’re management trainees or something.
P2:
They’re at the level Mr. Paine was supposed to be at if he hadn’t been effectively demoted when
he was officially assigned on his arrival in Venezuela.
MA:
That’s another problem. But in terms of the settlement thing, I’ve got to tell you I think a jury
around here, I think that the probability, the litigative probabilities, come out below fifty percent
on Mr. Paine’s side. In view of that, I think that it might be penny wise and pound foolish if you
say you’re going to go ahead to the wall for this unless we get a tremendous offer. I don’t think
it’s going to be coming.
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 69-70.
This last issue, of whether Paine’s job assignment in Venezuela was an effective demotion in rank,
bothered the magistrate throughout the conference, and was one of the issues he saw being raised if the pre-trial
order was amended.
One might think of this argument as “filler” used to pass time while thinking of what to do next, or to
create space between statements one does not want to be seen as related. Such argument usually is about issues
already considered and resolved, and since it is not intended for its own sake, it need not be responded to.
Perfunctory substantive argument between concessions in a negotiation end game and disjointed rambling at the
point of a major substantive topic shift, are two of the most common examples. Such argument allows parties to
catch up with and follow changes in the settlement conversation and to make concession-making look less arbitrary
than it probably is. These perceptions, in turn, increase participant confidence in the rationality of the negotiation
enterprise and make settlements more stable. See Condlin, supra note 7, at 101-02, for additional illustrations.
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whether “the company [was] prepared to . . . pay Paine some money to go away,” the impasse
broke.189 The Paine lawyers asked if Drillco was “prepared to help [Paine] in his efforts to
mitigate his damages and obtain comparable employment . . . [by] clear[ing] his record . . . [and]
giv[ing] him an affirmative recommendation?”190 This was a new request, but the strategy was
familiar. At moments of impasse, the Paine lawyers would escalate their demands by
introducing a new item into the bargaining conversation, hoping either that it would be the final
straw that caused the magistrate to give up, or that it would provide a new perspective on the
problem suggesting a mutually acceptable resolution. This time the strategy seemed to work,
though for which reason is not clear.
The magistrate replied to the question about an affirmative recommendation in the
following way.
MA:

Well, let me do this. I'll tell you what. Let's hold off a minute before we get into
. . . cause I realize that emotionally . . . I think Mr. Paine is interested in clearing
his reputation . . . .

P2:

Absolutely.

MA:

. . . and that is a non-monetary dynamic really, that I did not explore with [the
Drillco lawyer] because I discussed money. But I can tell you right now, in terms
of the money, there's just not a whole lot there. I don't think there's going to be. I
think in terms of the money going right to your client, I would think again,
although I don't have the authority from [the Drillco lawyer] to give you this, I
would think I might be able to squeeze twenty-five or thirty thousand out of him,
with the idea that there's going to be another few thousand for your fee, in terms
of the hours that you've put in.191 But, I haven't gone into these other inducements
to settlement and I'll see what he says about them. That's certainly a thing to
explore. I had just been looking at it as a money case because the pre-trial order
didn't ask anything about the reinstatement. I assumed he was happy where he
was. Did you have something to add? [The Paine lawyers were conversing
privately.]

PI:
MA:

No. I was just saying, obviously thirty thousand, without reinstatement, isn't what
you think [the Drillco lawyer] is quoting.
No. In fact, he has told me that . . . he hasn't told me what finite limits on it are,
but he has given me his evaluation of the case, which is below that figure. But
that's not to say I can't goose him up a little bit. That's why we have the
conference.192

189

Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 70.
Id.
191
This is a forty thousand dollar offer, in effect, thirty thousand for Paine and one-third on top of that for
attorneys’ fees. The magistrate and lawyers had established earlier that the lawyers would take one-third of the
recovery for their fee. The Paine lawyers did not hear this offer.
192
Id. at 70-71.
190
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Tentatively and equivocally, the magistrate told the Paine lawyers that they had a deal if
they wanted it. His equivocation was understandable. The lawyers had bargained aggressively
until then and if their latest representations about non-monetary compensation were not
trustworthy he wanted to be free to back away from his offer without seeming to contradict
himself. But if the representations were trustworthy and Paine genuinely valued future
employment more than money, there was an obvious middle-ground193 solution to the case.
Each side would concede in the currency it valued least. Paine would take less money and
Drillco would reinstate him, or help him find future employment (or perhaps both). By agreeing
to explore non-monetary terms with the Drillco lawyer, or as the magistrate put it, “goose him up
a little,”194 the magistrate, in effect, indicated to the Paine lawyers that their strategy of
expanding the bargaining pie195 to include reinstatement had worked.
The lawyers’ success seems attributable mostly to the fact that they outlasted the
magistrate. He had rejected reinstatement several times earlier in the caucus and appeared to be
sincere. Yet, the principal basis for his rejection, that reinstatement was not included within the
pre-trial order, was unconvincing; it did not explain why the remedy was a bad idea in and of
itself, or why it would not work here. He probably rejected the demand because he was
surprised by it and did not know what he thought about it, or because he did not want to
complicate the bargaining process by introducing a major, new item this late in the game.
Whatever his true motives, however, the Paine lawyers’ refusal to bargain against themselves by
giving in to the magistrate’s non-substantive objections was the correct bargaining move. By
pressing the argument for reinstatement in the face of the magistrate’s resistance, even to the
point of stubbornness, they risked antagonizing him to be sure, but they also gave themselves the
chance to learn that he was bluffing and that eventually he would concede the point.196 And the
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Only someone with a well developed sense of irony would describe this as a “problem-solving”
solution. Discussion during this part of the conference resembled a head-butting contest more than a joint venture
and the final resolution was based on an even split of a strategically distorted bargaining range more than the
discovery of a natural middle ground between complementary interests. The introduction of the reinstatement
option into the bargaining mix does suggest, however, that even adversarial bargainers can create value and that this
does not have to be done from a perspective of “both parties’ underlying interests and preferences.” See Robert H.
Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RES. 235 (1993).
194
Id. at 71.
195
Or pot. The choice of metaphor may depend upon whether one prefers the main course or dessert.
196
Put another way, the Paine lawyers won a contest of will with the magistrate over the issue of whether
to add reinstatement to the conference agenda. Some commentators advise against getting into tests of will with
other bargainers, suggesting that it looks stubborn, polarizes relationships and increases the risk of deadlock. See
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 31; FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 6. But see White, Machiavelli, supra note 13,
at (describing how contests of will are inevitable in bargaining), Nyerges, supra note 27, at 26 (“negotiation is . . .
a contest of will.”). Yet, if the Paine lawyers had followed this advice they would have come out of the conference
measurably poorer. Their success suggests that it is not whether one gets into contests of will, all advocacy is such a
contest to some extent, but how one does it, that is critical. Arguing points of disagreement does not polarize as
long as the focus is kept on the reasons for the disagreement and not the disagreement itself. Because bargainers
sometimes bluff, and at other times are slow to understand, calling bluffs and repeating arguments are necessary
parts of good advocacy practice. One must be courteous in doing this, of course, but the Paine lawyers show that it
can be done.
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latter is precisely what happened.197
The Paine lawyers recognized the importance of the magistrate’s agreement to explore
reinstatement and reinforced it almost immediately, both in a familiar and not so familiar way.
First, they pointed out that they had “some flexibility,” which the magistrate interpreted as a
signal that they could accept his offer.198 He began to speak as if the deal had been made.
MA:

If we put together a package that you and I and [the Drillco lawyer] all agree is
pretty reasonable, I certainly would be willing to talk to Mr. Paine. I do this
frequently to indicate that gee, here's something that the lawyers and especially in
Title VII cases, because there's a lot of emotion involved and here's something
that the lawyers feel is reasonably objective and you've got to take into account:
a) that the plaintiffs who get big verdicts are really as rare as hen's teeth unless
they are walked into the courtroom on a stretcher and b) that you've got the
chance that you may get zip for your efforts.199

But then, ostensibly for the purpose of helping Drillco implement reinstatement, the
Paine lawyers made one more escalation move, whether intended or not, suggesting that an
additional item be added to the agreement.
P1:

Also, your Honor, Drillco is a fairly large company and I think they can be
somewhat accommodating in terms of . . . our client is willing to relocate and . . .
200

Smiling, the magistrate recognized the problem immediately.
MA:

[Interrupting] Is that right?

PI:

Oh yes. And to be placed in a different . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] Well, who's going to pay for shipping?

PI:

The company, obviously.

MA:

There goes another five thousand bucks.201

Co-counsel intervened to soften the point.
P2:

If they have another division, it might be feasible for him to have a new start,

197

It is hard to tell from the tape whether the magistrate gave in (i.e., was finally convinced by the lawyers’
argument), or gave out (i.e., stopped objecting out of exhaustion). After the conference he said it was a little bit of
each.
198
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 71.
199
Id. at 71-72.
200
Id. at 72.
201
Id.
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even under the same company's auspices for example.202
This led to that rarest of all negotiation events, one bargainer stating the punch line to
another bargainer’s argument, as if it was an insight of his own.
MA:

Well, what did his work record . . . was his work record was alright?

P2:

His work record was superb until this incident. There's nothing whatsoever in the
records to indicate a single blemish in all of those years.

P1:

We're not talking about a one or two year tenure . . .

MA:

So you're . . . the company would have to be willing to say, well this was all a big
misunderstanding.203

With a straight face and more words than probably were necessary, counsel agreed.
P2:

I think that's a fair construction indeed to put on facts. If one accepts Mr. Paine’s
statement that he indeed consulted with [his Venezuelan supervisor] and gained
permission, it seems altogether possible to me that what we have here is a lot of
mutual misunderstanding, compounded by hostile attitudes by [the company
supervisor] towards Mr. Paine based on his race. And on that construction, it
would be fairly easy to restore the status quo ante by putting him in a somewhat
different setting, where his prior record would not come back to haunt him.204

The caucus then came to a close.
MA:

Alright. Let me get [the Drillco lawyer] in here and explore the possibility of
reinstatement, because I think, you know, very frankly, I just don't think there's
big bucks there, from the defendant in terms of money. I don't want to spend a lot
. . . on the other hand, if Mr. Paine was a decent employee they might be willing
to give him another chance and I told [the Drillco lawyer] that I think frankly,
sacking him was sort of steep . . .

P2:

[Interrupting] It's outrageous.

MA:

. . . over something like this and that fact is something that the jury may think
was, if not discriminatory in terms of race, maybe enough to give him at least
some sort of compromise verdict, which the company certainly doesn't want. It
doesn't help their image. All right. Let me get him in here and we'll explore these
other sort of non-monetary things.205

202

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
204
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 72-73.
205
Id. at 73.
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The conference itself was not over. The Drillco lawyer still had to approve the agreement
before it could become final and there was much in it that would surprise and perhaps shock him.
But the magistrate was committed to convincing him to sign off on the agreement, however, and
to see how he did this we must go to the next caucus.
3) Second Caucus with the Drillco Lawyer
There was no tentativeness, equivocation, or sense of mixed purposes in the magistrate's
second caucus with the Drillco lawyer. Using strategies numerous and varied, some even
borrowed from the Paine lawyers, he worked single-mindedly to convince the lawyer to accept
the “thirty-thousand dollar plus reinstatement” package. Unlike in the first caucus, where he
deferred to the lawyer, this time he took control of the conversation and argued directly for his
new view of the case’s value. His revised assessment of the evidence (in some instances
opposite to what he had said earlier), predictions of what the trial judge would permit and
interpretation of Title VII, all combined to make Drillco’s prospects look bleak. And when the
Drillco lawyer resisted, the magistrate asserted the authority of his position, almost instructing
the lawyer to settle. His arguments were long, didactic and forceful and when the lawyer
appeared ready to respond in kind the magistrate interrupted him to prevent that from happening.
The magistrate emphasized selected points, over and over, sometimes returning to them five or
six times, until the lawyer finally acquiesced. It was an about face from twenty minutes earlier.
While the substance of what the magistrate said was fairly aggressive, therefore, his manner was
not. He spoke in a soft tone of voice, smiled frequently and was never belligerent or rude. By
controlling just the content and structure of the conversation he relegated the lawyer's arguments
to brief asides, interspersed throughout his own potentially never-ending sermons on why the
settlement proposal ought to be accepted. He suffocated the Drillco lawyer rather than
pummeled him, outlasted him rather than beat him up. His performance was an object lesson in
the power of quiet, low-key, even cordial methods for controlling conversation, the power of
earnestly talking an issue to death, if you will, rather than beating it into submission.
The caucus took a little over ten minutes and focused principally on the topics of
reinstatement and money, with reinstatement receiving the lion's share of the attention. The
opening exchange reflected the caucus in a microcosm.
MA:

I think I've given them a realistic assessment of the money involved in the case. I
don't think they liked it, but I've given it to them anyway. It's up to them now.
What I told them, as I frequently do if all of us come to some agreement as to
where the case ought to settle, is that I'd be willing to talk with their client.
Sometimes it takes that push from the objective viewpoint to say, “Gee,
everybody including me, who has no ax to grind, thinks that this is a reasonable
place to come down.” But, I'll tell you very frankly . . . I think in order to settle
the case there's going to have to be something within a dollar range that's
reasonable and here I'm taking a little liberty, because I think what's reasonable
may be a little bit higher than what you've come up with, or what you've
indicated, but not much. I think you could probably go with that. But I think in
order for him to take that, perhaps the company . . . has the company considered
reinstating him in another division or another capacity, cause apparently there's
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nothing wrong with his work? Has that been considered?
DA:

[Extended pause] I've got to tell you this. I find reinstatement to be
monumentally unsuccessful. As a matter of fact, the only time I ever recommend
reinstatement to a client is if when the matter first comes up it seems pretty
obvious that somebody has made a mistake and the company recognizes that . . .

MA:

[Interrupting] Well, now look. Now, wait just a minute. As you know, under
Title VII that's a preferred remedy and [the judge] may make you do it here
anyway.

DA:

Oh, I understand that. I understand that.

MA:

You know that, so you'd have to swallow him unprepared and against your will.
The other thing is, very frankly in this case, I don't know how you came down on
it, but I thought that even if the guy didn't follow the proper steps to get
authorization, it is not like he went absolutely flat AWOL and sacking him for
this could come across to [the judge], who is going to be administering the
equitable remedy no matter what the jury does . . . and you know under Rule 39
(c) as I see it, the jury's findings are advisory only on Title VII in any case. And
there's no way he can make the jurors' findings absolutely binding one everybody,
including himself, under Circuit case law.

DA:

I would be surprised if he did not follow them.

MA:

Well, I would too. But there may be a different standard of review in connection
with it when it gets to the Circuit. But that's another whole kettle of fish. Our job
is to keep it from getting to the Circuit. But, he may decide that gee, look, this
guy . . . , really, canning him was so far beyond the pale of what his punishment,
what his sin called for, if in fact he sort of embellished it a little bit. They could
have deducted the airfare from his salary, they could have demoted him in rank,
reassigned him, done a million other things. Why was he canned for this thing?
You've got to admit that was awfully harsh.206

The Drillco lawyer knew he had reason to worry when the magistrate began with selfserving comments about how hard he had been on the Paine lawyers. He had forced them to be
realistic about money, he said, (it is interesting that he restricted this assertion to money), and to
look at the case from an objective point of view. He did not say that the lawyers had accepted
Drillco’s fifteen thousand dollar offer, however, as the Drillco lawyer might have expected given
the magistrate’s earlier approval of it as “reasonable.” The magistrate’s definition of reasonable
seemed to have changed. Now, what was reasonable “may be a little bit higher than what you
[i.e., the Drillco lawyer] have come up with.”207 More money was not the only surprise,
however, the magistrate also indicated that Drillco should reinstate Paine. Before the conference
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Id. at 73-75.
Id. at 74.
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the Drillco lawyer had said that he thought reinstatement might become an issue,208 but he was
surprised to hear it raised for the first time this late in the game, after a tentative agreement had
already been reached (or at least so he thought). A demand for reinstatement had not been
pleaded and the issue was not listed on the pre-trial order, so either the magistrate had been
holding back waiting to spring it on Drillco, or Paine’s lawyers had changed the magistrate’s
view of the case. Either way, it was clear that the Drillco lawyer now had to scramble to save his
deal and quickly, before the magistrate became hardened in his views.
The lawyer’s first response gave a clue as to how his efforts would founder. He
challenged the proposal for reinstatement in the abstract, generic reinstatement so to speak and
not the reinstatement of Paine in this particular case. This made his objection more academic
and less personal than was needed to make it credible and as a result it also made it easier to
dismiss. The Drillco lawyer’s response also was notable for what it did not say. If reinstatement
was truly out of the question one would expect that his reaction would have been more
immediate and decisive. He would not have had to think about it even for a short period of time,
because there would have been nothing to think about. He would have known instantly that he
couldn’t agree to reinstatement. But there was nothing spontaneous, reflexive, unequivocal, or
even lively, about his rejection of reinstatement. His manner was lifeless, his voice flat and
unanimated and his tone lacking in conviction. It was as if he was describing an objection to
reinstatement rather than actually objecting to it; as if he did not truly care much one way or the
other about whether Paine was reinstated. Given the situational forces pressing for reinstatement
(that it was a preferred remedy under Title VII, that it made the calculation of Paine’s damages
easier and that it was a middle-ground alternative between two zero-sum solutions), the absence
of a strong objection particularized to Paine told the magistrate that the lawyer would accept
reinstatement if pressed to do so and the magistrate already had decided to press him.
The Drillco lawyer’s reason for rejecting reinstatement, that it works only “when . . . it
seems pretty obvious that somebody has made a mistake,” played into the magistrate’s hands.209
It undercut the lawyer’s stated objection to reinstatement in general, since it was clear that he
sometimes recommended it and it transformed the central issue in the case into one of whether a
mistake had been made in discharging Paine. Since the magistrate already had determined that
the dispute grew out of “a big misunderstanding,” he was eager to discuss the case in these
terms.210 In a sense, the lawyer’s objection was just what the magistrate wanted to hear.
Throughout this segment of the conversation the Drillco lawyer’s equivocation, lack of
enthusiasm and failure to respond as if his ox had been gored, combined to make his efforts
unconvincing. He seemed to want to argue, but either did not know what to say, or was not
willing to let all of his feelings come out. Given his skill and experience the latter explanation
seems to make more sense.211
208

He expressed this concern in an interview before the conference.
Id.
210
Id. at 72.
211
The decision by the Paine lawyers to save reinstatement for their caucus with the magistrate contributed
to the Drillco lawyer’s predicament. If the topic had been broached in the full group meeting the Drillco lawyer
would have been able to respond to it and probably would have done a better job than the magistrate in pointing out
its weaknesses. The magistrate did not have all of the data needed to show the difficulties with reinstatement and
also did not have the necessary predisposition to challenge the idea aggressively. When the Drillco lawyer first
heard about reinstatement the magistrate was already committed to the idea, it was no longer an open question, and
209
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The rest of the discussion had a familiar ring to it. The Drillco lawyer parried the
magistrate's “harshness” argument with his “plaintiff lied” rebuttal, but this time the magistrate
was not so quick to accept the claim.212 The argument, he said, was grounded on the testimony
of a single Drillco employee who, in conducting an internal investigation of Paine’s
discrimination complaint, concluded that Paine had lied about being authorized to make his
Christmas trip back to the United States. But the magistrate now thought that bad blood between
Paine and that employee might have caused the employee to reach that conclusion.213
Interspersing offers with argument, he suggested that Paine be separated from the employee by
being relocated to another facility.214 The Drillco lawyer tacitly supported the suggestion by
acknowledging that “there was no complaint about [Paine’s] work.”215 The parties repeated the
“harshness/liar” cycle one more time, as the Drillco lawyer’s lukewarm responses seemed to
encourage the magistrate to persevere.
DA:

They are not . . . they do not want reinstatement.

MA:

Is that . . . that's adamant?

DA:

Well, . . . as adamant as they can be. I suppose if I told them you've got to do this,
they certainly would listen. I would expect them to. For what they're paying me,
they better listen, but . . . 216

The Drillco lawyer’s demise was now in full swing. The magistrate continued to press
for reinstatement (sometimes tying it to money damages), the lawyer resisted on the ground that
“[Paine was] dishonest with the company during the investigation,” and the magistrate countered
by expressing doubt that Paine had lied.217
MA:

Well, I mean, you know, I think, I get the feeling that if you were to come up with
a payment of maybe twenty-five thousand, thirty thousand, something like that
and reinstate Mr. Paine, you could settle the case. Now, I don't know that that's
outside the ballpark in connection with what's reasonable. I don't see a dollar, you
know in terms of the dollar value of a verdict . . . . I don't see this as a high dollar
value case for settlement purposes. It's essentially your cost, plus something to
get him to settle. But I do see, if the verdict goes against you, I see a judicially
mandated reinstatement as a real possibility here, given the fact that his prior
work record was . . . , as you know it's an equitable remedy, but I think the
Supreme Court has said it's pretty well inescapable. But even if it were escapable,
a) you've got a great big corporation, it's not like reinstatement in a ma-and-pa
grocery store, with world-wide operations and nationwide operations in this

the lawyer had to make his objections with the deck stacked against him.
212
“Maybe the guy wasn’t lying.” Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 76.
213
“I mean, you know, that’s your man’s assessment of Mr. Paine’s credibility.” Id. at 75.
214
“Well . . . have you . . . listen, have you talked to management about the chance of reinstating him
somewhere else?” Id.
215
Id. at 76.
216
Id. at 76-77.
217
“I’m not sure. . . that your position is really that terribly strong that he outright lied.” Id. at 77.
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country. You've got a guy who didn't do anything wrong until he hit Venezuela
and ran up against this crew down there. And a guy who worked his way up
through the ranks of the company and perhaps ought to be given another
opportunity. I think the judge would feel, as I feel frankly, that firing him on
account of this was pretty doggone harsh. I don't think they have looked at it in
terms of disparate discipline here either. Now it may very well be – I don't want
to give them any ideas – but maybe one of the things they should have done is to
see what's happened to other employees, namely white employees, who got
caught doing something similar to this. Now, if they do that you're in big trouble
too. If they convene the court . . . if they could find anything.218
The magistrate was now out of patience. This was his most forceful attempt to convince
the Drillco lawyer that his client might lose and it represented a complete reversal from his
earlier view that the evidence favored Drillco.219 But more than a prediction of loss at trial, the
magistrate’s statement also was a tacit threat. While professing not to “want to give them any
ideas,” in fact, he was saying that if the present offer was not taken he would suggest to the Paine
lawyers that they consider amending their complaint to add a disparate impact claim and this, in
turn, would increase Drillco’s exposure exponentially.220 In his own quiet, low-key way, the
magistrate had begun to be somewhat heavy-handed.221
Seizing the moment, the magistrate asked for the fourth time in five minutes, “Can you
explore with your personnel people the possibility of reinstating Paine in another division . . .
and if you are concerned about it, it may be that he would agree to a reinstatement on a one or
two year probationary kind of thing and you could work out an arbitration.”222 Whether
convinced, intimidated, exhausted, or whatever, at this point the Drillco lawyer expressed an
interest in reinstatement for the first time and began to ask about how it would be done.223 The
magistrate jumped at the chance to discuss specifics, even to the extent of advancing proposals
he had not raised yet with the Paine lawyers.224 Relocation, in particular, posed difficult issues
under Drillco’s collective bargaining agreement with its union and a discussion of those
difficulties would prove to be the Drillco lawyer’s last stand.
MA:

Well, I think he'd be looking for reinstatement at something close to his
supervisory level that he was at here in the States. But not with the Venezuelan
salary. Work that he's capable of doing and that he did three years before he went
down to Venezuela.
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Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 79-80.
See supra Part III.3.
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“I don’t think that they have looked at it in terms of disparate discipline here either . . . . Now, if they do
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DA:

Yeah, this can create problems for us because, as you know, we're union shop . . .

MA:

No, I didn't know that. I'm sorry. Even the supervisors?

DA:

No. Once you leave the . . . once you go into the supervisory ranks you're out of
the unit. . .

MA:

So, he's white collar now?

DA:

He was when he left.

MA:

He was when he left.

DA:

And we draw our supervisors by folks up from the ranks and under our bargaining
agreement if we try to bring a supervisor in from the outside without . . . outside
the shop . . .

MA:

You mean from outside the shop.

DA:

. . . from outside the shop, we've got a problem. And there's no keeping it a secret
as to why he's there.

MA:

It's not a company wide CBA?

DA:

Yes . . . . No . . . well, it's both. It's a company wide agreement and then there are
local agreements. But there's no way to hide why this guy is being brought in as a
supervisor because we're going to have to make some explanation.

MA:

Don't you ever have transfer of supervisors?

DA:

Sure, but you have to explain why somebody's being transferred into a particular
shop. We don't have that much of it.

MA:

Well, how . . . you have to explain it to the local union. Can't you just say that it's
a simply a personnel decision to . . . does the CBA expressly cover this? I don't
think it does, does it?

DA:

It covers it as far as people having the opportunity to bid on supervisory jobs. We
have to have a bid posting. Now, we don't have to choose somebody from the
bargaining unit, but as a practical matter, when you don't choose somebody from
the bargaining unit you really have to make some explanations. And that's . . .
you know, I suppose theoretically, you could shove it down to the union's throat,
but you don't do that.

MA:

Well, I think . . . that's . . . these are practical problems that I don't think are
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insurmountable. I think the important thing is to . . . why don't we do this, I'll
bring plaintiff's counsel in here and talk to them about it in a minute. Can you
explore with management the possibility of reinstatement in some other
supervisory position, plus a relatively modest cash payment?225
Unable to deny or disprove an argument based on a collective bargaining agreement he
had not seen, the magistrate pushed the argument aside. Dismissing the lawyer’s concerns as
“practical problems that I don't think are insurmountable,” he asked for a fifth time, “Can you
explore with management the possibility of reinstatement in some other supervisory position,
plus a relatively modest cash payment?”226 Two minutes of rambling, disjointed and off-topic
conversation followed,227 which the magistrate ended by asking for the sixth and final time, “Can
you see your way to recommending something like this?”228 For whatever reason, the logjam
broke and the Drillco lawyer accepted the offer in a burst of euphemistic virtuosity.
DA:

I can recommend something like . . . let me put it this way. I can explore
something like this in a positive tone with my client, because frankly, it needs a
lot of explanation. There are a lot of tentacles hanging out there, but if it can be
done, I would certainly make an effort to make it happen, provided the money
comes down right. Now, if it's going to cost us that and a ton of money too, it's
not worth it.229

Like the magistrate, the Drillco lawyer first fought the reinstatement demand reflexively,
probably because he was surprised by it and not sure what implications it had for the case as a
whole, but he was not quite able to pull it off. His arguments were too predictable and too few,
were presented with too little enthusiasm and were undercut by his recurring admission (tacit and
explicit), that he had recommended reinstatement in the past and if pressed hard enough could do
it again.230 With no force to his assertions and an air of resignation about him, it seemed only a
matter of time before he would accede to the magistrate's demands. For his part, the magistrate
seemed to recognize this and did what he could to hasten the inevitable, ignoring the lawyer’s
half-hearted efforts to resist. In the end, both sides accepted reinstatement, not because it was
the wisest course, it may or may not have been, but because there was more said for it than
against it in the limited information available to the parties for their discussion of this issue.
A big inning is not a ball game, however, and there still were other issues to discuss. The
parties had not discussed money, for example, and the Drillco lawyer might use this issue to save
the deal by demanding that Paine accept less than the fifteen thousand dollars previously offered.
This would have been a reasonable demand given that the fifteen thousand dollar offer included
money for lost front pay and reinstatement would eliminate that loss. When he qualified his
acceptance of reinstatement with the condition that “the money comes down right,” the Drillco
225

Id. at 81-82.
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 82.
227
This was more “filler” argument. See supra note 189.
228
Transcript of Drillco Pre-Trial Conference at 83.
229
Id. at 83-84.
230
In fact, he seemed to invite the magistrate to help him do so by saying, “Now, if a federal judge shoves
somebody down your throat, that’s another matter . . . that’s easier for somebody to swallow.” Id. at 76.
226

53

lawyer seemed to understand this point but, unfortunately, he did not act on it.231 The discussion
of money was shorter than the discussion of reinstatement and considerably more one-sided.
The magistrate began by re-stating his monetary offer.
MA:

Well, I don't think it would cost you a ton of money. Let's say you could get him
for like that and maybe thirty all-in, which would be cash to him plus . . . they've
got about thirty-five hours in it and if you figure . . . they're talking about one
hundred and twenty-five an hour. They're not . . . they're loathe, as I can
understand, ethically, to negotiate the whole thing as a package. But you've got to
look at it as a bottom line.232

Not only had the money not “come down right,” it had gone up. At the end of the first
caucus the magistrate seemingly had agreed that Paine’s case was worth fifteen to twenty
thousand dollars, without reinstatement. Now that reinstatement had eliminated part of Paine’s
damages it seemed only reasonable to expect that he would be satisfied with less money; but
thirty thousand was twice fifteen, not less than it. The Drillco lawyer could have been shocked,
perhaps even angry, at this chain of events; at a minimum, he should have been curious about
whether he had heard the magistrate correctly. But instead, he reacted calmly, in the same lowkey, non-agitated manner as when first told about reinstatement.233 His first expressed concern,
in fact, was about whether attorney's fees could be negotiated together with the merits, not
whether thirty thousand dollars was a reasonable figure. When he got around to discussing the
thirty thousand dollars his objections were surprisingly restrained.
DA:

But when you're talking . . . you get up to thirty thousand, you've now doubled
where I thought we were reasonable before and that's getting awful rich, including
reinstatement, that's getting awful rich.

MA:

Yet, but if you're . . . I mean, you used a mathematical analogy before: double two
is four; double twenty thousand is forty thousand. We're not anywhere near that.

DA:

No. But we were talking fifteen thousand.

MA:

Well fifteen to twenty.

DA:

Well, I was talking fifteen, you were talking twenty.

MA:

Well, that's right, fifteen to twenty, as you said. It may be thirty all-in, which
would include attorney’s fees.

DA:

Well, I always deal all-in. When I talk money, I talk all-in.

MA:

But they're real antsy. Now, I heard . . . now I didn't know this. They said that
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there's some case that the Supreme Court has got about whether it is ethical or not
for plaintiffs attorneys to negotiate in a case like this where they've got a statutory
fee. Do you know anything about this?
DA:

There has been some discussion about that and . . .

MA:

It's always worried me and contingent fees in general, tort cases and whatever . . .

DA:

Well, I think the crux of the problem is that the defendant can't say I will pay
three dollars to the plaintiff and one dollar to the plaintiff's . . .

MA:

Right, right.

DA:

. . . but the defendant can say I'll pay five dollars . . .

MA:

All-in. You figure it out.

DA:

. . . and I don't care how you folks split it up but that's all I'm paying.

MA:

But I can understand the hesitance to negotiate . . . well let's say, just for the sake
of argument, if we would get this thing settled for cash of thirty all-in, plus some
reinstatement package.

DA:

Too much.

MA:

Too much. Twenty-five. I don't think they'd go a penny below twenty-five.
Twenty-five. That's twenty to him and maybe five to them, which is a reasonable
contingency. Because you know, if they go three weeks and win this thing, by
god, in addition to a lot of money and reinstating the guy, you're going to have to
pay their bill. That's going to stick in management's craw even more than
anything else.

DA:

Even more than paying mine.

MA:

That's right. They know they're going to pay yours anyway. You hate to pay for
your own drawing and quartering.234

DA:

All right. Well, let me put it this way. I will recommend and I assume my client
would go along with the twenty-five and I will explore this possibility of
reinstatement.235

For all of their frequency, the Drillco lawyer’s objections reduced to the simple
proposition that he did not want to pay thirty thousand dollars. Twice he said this (“that's getting
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awful rich,”236 “too much”237), but in neither instance did he give reasons for his objections and
when he finally agreed to recommend twenty-five thousand he did not give a reason for stopping
there either. In bargaining theory parlance, he shifted his approach at this point from “reasoned
elaboration”238 to “positional bargaining.”239 Unlike the stereotype of the positional bargainer,
however, he was not rude or belligerent and he did not present his position in take-it or leave-it
language. Instead, he seemed to say, in code he was confident the magistrate would understand,
that he had already gone far enough and that it was the magistrate’s responsibility to force the
Paine lawyers to take the final step. In a sense, he was appealing to the magistrate to do him a
favor, but the turn to appeal, as we have seen, is never a good sign,240 and here it would save
only nickels and dimes, the last five thousand dollars of a settlement that already was too
generous. Whether he won this point or lost it did not matter much. He had lost the war.
After a brief aside on whether to include attorney's fees in the final package, the
magistrate accepted the twenty-five thousand dollar counter-offer and agreed to present it to
Paine’s lawyers.
MA:

That's it. All-in, I know. It's going to be a take-it or leave-it thing. And what
we'd have to work out . . . again if it can't be worked out amicably, which I think
it can be because they're decent people, I don't think they're sandbagging . . . that
there would be a settlement with a reinstatement along with it on some reasonable
basis. Alright, let me get them back in here.241

It is somewhat surprising that the Drillco lawyer agreed to this proposal. He believed that
Paine had only a twenty-five percent chance of winning his claim on the merits and yet he agreed
to pay all of Paine’s attorney’s fees, seventy-five percent of his lost Venezuelan income and all
of his future income (by reinstating him). Paine would have had a difficult time improving on
these terms at trial. Talented as the Drillco lawyer was, this was not an exemplary performance
and his failure took several forms. He did not exploit, or perhaps even recognize, the
magistrate's lack of conviction in asking for both reinstatement and money, for example, instead
he played out his pre-negotiation plan of paying up to twenty-five thousand dollars even after the
premises on which that plan was based had been discredited. He allowed the bargaining process
to be compressed into a offer-offer-agreement format that did not provide time for numerous,
small and grudging concessions. He edited his expectations of possible recovery downward
during the course of the bargaining conversation itself rather than break off discussion to think
about such an adjustment under less pressured circumstances.
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If there was a single, strategic move which dictated the outcome of the conference,
however, it was the Paine lawyers’ introduction of the reinstatement demand. The Drillco
lawyer seemed truly surprised by this demand,242 and even though he had anticipated it he was
unable to generate objections quickly enough to fight it off, or shift gears quickly enough to
recoup his losses when the discussion turned to money. Reinstatement put him permanently on
the defensive, one step behind the magistrate for the remainder of their discussion and the
magistrate, in turn, was one step behind the Paine lawyers. The Drillco lawyer never seemed to
see how the case divided naturally into two parts, one of which (reinstatement) was Paine’s
payoff and the other of which (money) was Drillco’s. Nor did he seem to realize that he needed
to alter his low-key, candid, among-friends, bargaining approach once he realized that the Paine
lawyers were not bargaining in the same way. His approach might have worked in another
conference, with different participants, where bureaucratic processing was the norm, but a more
animated and aggressive strategy was called for here. The conference was not over yet,
however, since the Paine lawyers still had to agree to the proposed deal and while it was similar
to the deal they already had approved, the chance to think about it might have given them second
thoughts. It was with that concern that the magistrate met with the Paine lawyers for the second
and final time.
4) Second Caucus with the Paine Lawyers
The second caucus with the Paine lawyers should have been the shortest and most
agreeable of all of the magistrate’s meetings since the offer he brought back included almost
everything the lawyers had asked for. Paine would be reinstated and thus would have no frontpay damages and he would be given almost all of his lost back pay, subject only to a deduction
for attorneys’ fees. Yet, the meeting took twenty minutes and the discussion was contentious.
The magistrate opened the discussion with a long, rambling statement describing the several
obstacles he purportedly had overcome to obtain the Drillco lawyer’s assent (e.g., fitting the
agreement within the terms of the company’s collective bargaining agreement, finding an
acceptable location for Paine to be reinstated and devising a probationary reinstatement period),
and at the end of that statement he revealed the Drillco lawyer’s counter offer. Upon hearing the
counter offer, the Paine lawyers took a short break and when they returned to the caucus they
went on the offensive.
The lawyers started in a somewhat half-hearted manner, making numerous points but not
dwelling on any of them, about the inclusion of attorneys’ fees in the settlement package and the
length of the probationary period. Their first serious objection was directed at the offer to pay
Paine twenty-five thousand dollars for his past economic harm. They wanted at least thirty
thousand dollars, they said, and couldn’t, “in good conscience,” recommend anything less.243
But they were boxed in by their own past omission. They had authorized a thirty thousand dollar
offer, in effect, by failing, in the first caucus, to challenge the magistrate’s calculation of back
242
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pay damages and letting him go back to the Drillco lawyer thinking that thirty thousand dollars
was enough. When he returned with a counter-offer of twenty-five, the difference between the
two numbers was not large enough to make an objection believable. No one in that situation
would risk the loss of reinstatement and most of Paine’s back pay for the chance to add another
five thousand dollars to the pot, no matter what they said they would do. The amount of money
involved was simply too small to deadlock over. The lawyers tried to convince the magistrate
(and perhaps themselves) that they needed thirty thousand dollars,244 but it was a half-hearted
effort and he refused to believe them and said as much.
MA:

I don’t think the thirty is there. But I mean if you’re just talking about twentyfive thousand dollars, the difference is five thousand dollars, cause he’s adamant
that is it; and it’s just not worth it, it seems to me, to derail this thing for five
thousand dollars.245

The lawyers’ persistence might have been more successful had they picked up on the
magistrate’s suggestion in their first caucus that Paine’s past damages were worth more than
thirty thousand dollars. The magistrate had indicated at one point that he thought fifty thousand
dollars was an upper limit, but the lawyers did not pin him down to that higher figure and it
dropped out of the conversation. When the magistrate went back to the Drillco lawyer for the
second time, therefore, he presented the dollar figure he thought would be easiest for the lawyer
to accept and that was thirty thousand dollars. In bargaining parlance, the Paine lawyers failed to
expand the monetary bargaining range to provide room for more than one round of concessions.
If fifty thousand dollars was still a possibility when they met with the magistrate for the second
time, the objection to thirty thousand would have been more credible. Twenty thousand dollars
would have been worth fighting over. But five thousand dollars was not. Recognizing their
position was untenable, the Paine lawyers continued to argue for it anyway, probably to make
their ultimate acceptance of the Drillco counter offer appear grudging. If the magistrate thought
he had to force the agreement on the lawyers he would be less likely to have second thoughts
about whether it was fair, or be concerned that he had been out-bargained.246 After several
rounds of somewhat perfunctory and stylized argument, therefore, the Paine lawyers agreed to
recommend reinstatement and twenty-five thousand dollars “with some caveats.”247
The parties reconvened as a group for a feisty memorialization of the agreement. Each
side hedged its bets somewhat, expressing the view that if the remaining logistical issues (e.g.,
the length of Paine’s probationary period, the location of his new assignment and the like), could
not be worked out then the deal was off. While each of the lawyers was disappointed with the
outcome, the Drillco lawyer perhaps described the agreement best when, in responding to a Paine
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lawyer’s complaint, he commented: “I’ve given you the ranch. I mean, what do you want?”248
The magistrate offered to mediate any lingering disagreements, expressed pleasure at having had
the chance to work with each of the lawyers and the conference ended.
**************************
What then may be said about the Drillco negotiation in the aggregate and what lessons
may be learned from it about bargaining behavior in general? To begin with, the parties’ final
agreement was pretty one-sided. By almost any standard Paine did much better than Drillco. He
got his job back and almost all of his back pay and while his future with the company might not
have been that bright, he had time and (the company’s) money with which to look around for
something better. It is hard to see how he could have improved upon this outcome in litigation.
That said, it is a little surprising that highly skilled and evenly matched lawyers, working with
case law and evidence that also was evenly balanced, would reach an agreement so obviously
one-sided. It is not difficult to describe how it happened. The magistrate and the Drillco lawyer
went into the conference thinking that the case was worth somewhere between fifteen and
twenty-five thousand dollars. Ironically, the Paine lawyers thought almost the same thing, but
they also thought they could convince the magistrate that it was worth several times that amount.
Direct discussion among the lawyers quickly became heated and reached an impasse. The
magistrate tried to break the impasse by caucusing privately with each side, in a kind of shuttle
diplomacy, but when he decided to meet with the Drillco lawyer first he virtually guaranteed that
Drillco would make the first serious offer and this tipped the balance of the negotiation in favor
of Paine. When asked what he would pay to settle, the Drillco lawyer made a reasonable offer.
He did not dissemble, exaggerate, or posture (at least not very much), because he was a friend of
the magistrate and did not want to antagonize or insult him. He understood that the Paine
lawyers might not reciprocate his reasonableness and that he was vulnerable to a maximizing
offer in return, but he thought the magistrate would protect him from that risk.
Unfortunately for the Drillco lawyer, the Paine lawyers redefined the bargaining range
for the magistrate by introducing an unexpected non-monetary demand (reinstatement) with
substantial monetary consequences, asking for “cash register” compensatory damages and
(unknowingly) exploiting the magistrate’s private fear that the pre-trial order would be amended
to add new claims. The lawyers’ arguments may have convinced the magistrate that these
demands were serious and the risks real, though it is more likely that they simply surprised him
with their novelty and force and he was unable to recover in time to put the arguments in proper
perspective. As a consequence, he deferred to them more than was warranted. The arguments
were more numerous, more elaborately developed, more fully grounded in the evidence and
more emphatically made than his own and he simply may have decided to avoid them rather than
fight. It would not be unusual for a person trained in law to defer (even if privately) to what
appeared to be a superior case but if this is what happened it is important to recognize that this
appearance of superiority was misleading. The Paine lawyers’ age discrimination argument, for
example, which seemed to stymie the magistrate’s efforts to challenge the front pay demand for
two hundred thousand dollars, was not self-evidently correct, the lawyers did not provide any
knock-down reasons to support it and even if it was correct, it did not justify a two hundred
thousand dollar demand. These and other such problems notwithstanding, the magistrate seemed
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to accept the Paine lawyers’ argument as true249 and then argue the case (describing it as his
own) to the Drillco lawyer. The Drillco lawyer, in turn, seemed equally unprepared or unwilling
to contest the arguments, acceded to the magistrate’s pressure and gave the Paine lawyers almost
everything they asked for. In short, the Paine lawyers changed the magistrate’s mind (or at least
his behavior), the magistrate changed the Drillco lawyer’s mind (or at least his behavior), and
Paine won big.250
While this may explain the sequence of events in the conference it does not say much
about why the Paine lawyers’ strategy worked, whether it was an exemplary one, or whether
other bargainers should try to emulate it. To answer these questions we first need to know more
about whether the settlement was likely to be stable. If the Drillco lawyer later would try to set
the agreement aside, for example, or negate its effects in some other way,251 because he was
angry at being manipulated, deceived, or surprised, the strategy was not effective, the
agreement’s favorable terms notwithstanding. When asked if he would have tried to upset the
settlement, however, the Drillco lawyer said no, that while he was not happy with it, he did not
249
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think the Paine lawyers breached any moral, social or legal limits in making their case. He
blamed himself and the magistrate more than the Paine lawyers for the one-sided outcome. He
resolved to bargain more aggressively with the lawyers should they meet again in the future,252
but he did not question the legitimacy of their success here. He was an aggressive bargainer
himself, as most lawyers are, and at some level he may have had a grudging appreciation of the
Paine lawyers’ performance. His “given you the ranch” comment at the end of the conference
seemed to indicate that he knew what had happened.253
Drillco itself also was likely to be satisfied with the settlement since its opinion would be
based principally on information provided by its lawyer and he would describe the agreement as
achieving all that was possible.254 He would emphasize how the magistrate took Paine’s side in
pressing aggressively for reinstatement, how it would cost almost as much to try the case as to
pay Paine’s damages, how Paine had always been a good employee and now would be an even
better one after the unpleasantness of the lawsuit and how Paine’s personality clash with the
supervisor in Venezuela was probably an isolated incident that would not be likely to recur when
Paine rejoined the company stateside. The lawyer would not say much about how the parties
arrived at the agreement’s particular terms because he did not understand fully how that
happened himself. He was confused by the magistrate’s abrupt shift in allegiance, for example,
and not sure whether he had been misled all along or whether the shift was the Paine lawyers
doing. Having agreed to the deal, however, he would sell it to the client255 to keep the case
252
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closed on his docket, the magistrate happy and his reputation intact. Similar to the Paine
lawyers’ strategy in the conference itself, first he would convince himself and then he would
convince the client.256
Once Drillco approved the settlement the case would drop off the radar screen of both the
lawyer and client. It was not an intrinsically noteworthy case in any conventional sense. The
money involved was not large, the issues were not unique, the time and energy invested were not
great and the bargaining conversation itself left no lingering personal grievances or wounds that
the Drillco lawyer would feel the need to vindicate down the road.257 Unless Paine revived the
case’s memory by getting into a similar brouhaha in the future, other controversies would come
along to replace it on both parties’ schedules, they would forget about it and the dispute would be
“resolved.” There might be lingering questions about whether the agreement was fair,
particularly to Drillco, but these would be of interest only to someone with a rights-based
conception of legal bargaining. Communitarian bargainers would be satisfied that the dispute
was over.
We then come to the question of why the Paine lawyers’ strategy succeeded. Bargaining
competitively can be counter productive, particularly when it crosses over into, or is interpreted
as, being belligerent, rude, insensitive and the like and yet the Paine lawyers’ arguments caused
the magistrate to change his mind and agree with their position rather than become angry and
reject it. The key to their success seems to lie in the combination of attitudes and maneuvers that
made their arguments persuasive even when probably incorrect and a little bit pushy. The
lawyers deceived the magistrate as to their true intentions, motives and beliefs, for one thing,
surprised and impressed him with questionable claims he did not anticipate and could not rebut
on the spur of the moment, convinced him of their sincerity and intransigence and wore him
down. Each of these qualities is a mainstream feature of positional or adversarial bargaining and
the sort of quality that communitarian bargaining theory advises against.
the negotiation literature to discuss this process of “cooling out the client” in the language of “frame analysis,” see
e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 SO. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996) (“The
attorney can control the client’s frame, thereby influencing settlement decisions in either direction.”), though the
examples given usually present agent-principal problems more than framing ones. For additional perspectives on
the lawyer-client decision-making process in bargaining, see Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret
Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 ILL. L. REV. 43 (1999); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 SO. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375
(1997).
256
For an insightful description of ways lawyers (including judges conducting pre-trial conferences), can
“spin” mediators to realize their own (the lawyers’) purposes, see Dwight Golann, How to Borrow a Mediator’s
Powers, 30 LITIG. 41 (2004). The process of conforming desires to options, of aligning what one wants with what is
available, has been explained by Jon Elster under the rubric of “adaptive preference formation.” See EXPLAINING
TECHNICAL CHANGE: A CASE STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 86 (Jon Elster & Gudmund Hernes eds.,
1983); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 110 (1983); JON ELSTER,
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 54 (1993); JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES; Jon Elster, The
Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 103-32
(Jon Elster et al. eds., 1986). Elster defines “the adjustment of wants to possibilities . . . [as] a causal process taking
place ‘behind the back’ of the individual concerned. The driving force behind such adaptation is the often intolerable
tension and frustration (‘cognitive dissonance’) of having wants that one cannot possibly satisfy.” Jon Elster, Belief,
Bias and Ideology, in RATIONALITY AND RELATIVISM 126-27 (Martin Hollis & Steven Lukes eds., 1982).
257
Each of these qualities make the case a run-of-the-mill bargaining problem and representative of lawyer
bargaining generally.
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Consider first the Paine lawyers’ ability to keep their true intentions and beliefs secret.
Before the conference they had said they would be willing to settle the case for something in the
vicinity of twenty-five thousand dollars, without reinstatement, if that was all that was available.
They appraised the case in terms almost identical to those of the Drillco lawyer and magistrate,
in other words, and while they hoped to get more than twenty-five thousand dollars, they thought
twenty-five was a fair figure, or at least that it was the most Paine could expect from a court.
Unlike the Drillco lawyer, however, they also thought they could persuade the magistrate that the
case was worth much more than that and that they could do this by convincing him to treat their
inflated demands as serious proposals. Rather than try for a disproportionate share of an evenly
balanced bargaining range, difficult to do because winning and losing is obvious, the Paine
lawyers planned to create an imbalanced range to begin with and then appear to be fair by
dividing it evenly. This strategy required that the lawyers either convince the magistrate that
their inflated demands were serious and the Drillco lawyer’s equivalent counter-offers (if
forthcoming) were not, or have the Drillco lawyer make an unreciprocated, reasonable starting
offer. Their own skill produced the former and the magistrate’s decision to meet with the Drillco
lawyer first produced the latter.
The lawyers were able to fool the magistrate about their level of commitment to their
expressed demands, in large measure, because they looked sincere, even earnest (and perhaps
were), in stating the demands, even when what they said was implausible and in some instances
outrageously so.258 They admitted privately, for example, that they could not defend the demand
for one hundred thousand dollars for past economic harm and yet they made it anyway,
unembarrassedly and enthusiastically and discussed it at length, as if they expected the
magistrate to accept it.259 Throughout this discussion they spoke in ordinary, well-modulated
tones, did not interrupt to repeat points not immediately accepted, did not talk over the
magistrate to prevent their points from being challenged and were calm and relaxed, as if they
expected anyone who thought about the issue ultimately to agree with their view.260 Only their
failure to describe the manner in which they calculated Paine’s damages gave any indication that
they might have been dissembling (apart from the inherent implausibility of the demand).261
258

The two hundred thousand dollar demand, for example. See discussion supra Part III.3. The magistrate
made the common mistake of testing the reliability of the Paine lawyers’ statements by trying to determine whether
they were sincere rather than plausible. It is possible for bargainers to convince themselves of the most god-awful
things and then communicate those beliefs sincerely to others. This does not mean that they will act on the beliefs.
For that to be true, the beliefs must be plausible. See Condlin, supra note 12, at 6-10 (describing the contextual
factors that make interpreting the predictive value of bargainer communication difficult).
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The magistrate should have pressed them on this point. Asking an adversary to explain the basis of a
demand is an elementary principle of good bargaining. A demand which cannot be grounded on principle is not
serious and should not be treated as if it was. Had he asked, the negotiation might have gone down a completely
different path, since the Paine lawyers did not have a convincing explanation for how they came up with the one
hundred thousand dollar figure.
260
See Welsh, supra note 3, at 765 (“If a negotiator perceives that the other negotiator gave her sufficient
opportunity to speak, tried to be open-minded in considering what she had to say, and treated her with respect, she is
more likely to view the outcome of the negotiation as fair . . . .”).
261
Had they paid more attention to this issue of principled justification they also might have heard the
magistrate suggest that the case could be worth as much as fifty thousand dollars and had they heard this they might
not have allowed him to go back to the Drillco lawyer with only a thirty thousand dollar demand. This, in turn,
would have changed the size of the difference between the parties’ last two offers and made the Paine lawyers
attempt to hold out for an additional concession (in the final caucus) more credible.
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The Drillco lawyer, by contrast, was a good deal more forthcoming, less rigid and easier
to read. While he never told the magistrate the most that Drillco would pay to settle, he gave
numerous indications that he would increase his offer and his comments about how he assessed
the case were considerably more candid than those of the Paine lawyers. His fifteen to twenty
thousand dollar offer, for example, was very close to his true bottom line and he did not try to
decrease it when the opportunity presented itself (after reinstatement was added to the agenda).
He also acknowledged, more than once, implicitly as well as directly, that he could recommend
reinstatement even though he had good arguments for not doing so,262 and reinstatement
radically reconfigured the dispute in favor of Paine. His comments, unlike those of the Paine
lawyers, could be taken at face value most of the time. In effect, he reciprocated the presumption
of candor the magistrate accorded the lawyers, even as the Paine lawyers routinely exploited it.
The Paine lawyers also were a good deal more suspicious than the Drillco lawyer of the
magistrate’s comments about the case. They believed few, if any, of the magistrate’s statements
about what Drillco would be willing to pay (or do) to settle, for example, and saw everything he
said as an exaggeration at best, a misrepresentation or lie at worst. They also assumed that they
could change the magistrate’s views whenever they were unfavorable to Paine and, because of
this, challenged many of his statements almost reflexively, particularly early in the conference
when he routinely sided with Drillco, hoping to have him qualify or reverse his position and
many times he did. The Drillco lawyer, by comparison, took most of the magistrate’s assertions
at face value, challenged them minimally, never for very long and only on marginal points. He
seemed to assume that the magistrate’s views were fixed and that they would determine the basic
structure of the settlement.263 He acted more like someone intent on finding out what the
magistrate believed, rather than someone intent on convincing him of what to believe.264
The Paine lawyers also were able to engage the magistrate in lengthy discussions of
individual arguments, even weak ones, in a manner that helped breathe life into the arguments
and give them a greater degree of influence than was warranted. The magistrate was partly
responsible for this. He was habitually courteous, according lawyers a presumption of good faith
262

The company’s collective bargaining agreement with the union made reinstatement difficult and perhaps
impossible. The magistrate would have had to take the lawyer’s word for this since he (the magistrate) had not seen
the agreement.
263
These qualities of secretiveness (about one’s own views) and suspiciousness (about the other sides’
views) are paired in the voting, so to speak; in fact, one is the natural corollary of the other. It is common for
someone who is secretive to assume that others are as well and thus rational to be suspicious of what they have to
say.
264
There was little risk that, in retrospect, the magistrate would discover that the Paine lawyers had
deceived him and, as a consequence, approach them with greater suspicion in the future. He would have no reason
to reflect on the conference, for one thing, it was just one of dozens of conferences like it, all of which would fade
quickly into obscurity as others took their place. But even if he wanted to reflect on it, he did not have access to
information about the lawyers’ true beliefs and intentions that would indicate that he had been deceived. He would
know only that the Paine lawyers were inventive and tenacious and that they came well prepared, but that would
cause him to make few, if any, adjustments in his approach to them in the future. Only the lawyers’ above-ordinary
level of enthusiasm and energy was something he could not have predicted and these qualities told him nothing
about the extent to which their public representations deviated from their private thoughts. Bargaining aggressively,
as long as it does not become personal, rarely offends other lawyers or judges in any lasting sense. They will blame
the outcome on the situation, or the weakness of their case, more than on the other lawyer. Belligerent and rude
bargaining carries such risks, but belligerent and rude behavior is easily avoided.
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whether justified or not and deferring to them in the presentation of their cases. He would have
given the Paine lawyers a great deal of leeway no matter what they said, but the lawyers helped
themselves in this regard by presenting their arguments in ways that made them seem more
substantial than they were. They made many more individual arguments than the magistrate and
Drillco lawyer, for example, so many more, in fact, that the sheer number at times seemed to
overwhelm the magistrate and make it difficult for him to understand and evaluate them. The
lawyers also surprised the magistrate on several occasions with unexpected arguments based on
seemingly irrelevant case law, unusual perspectives on issues raised by the pre-trial order and
non-obvious but defensible expansions of issues raised by the order. They seemed to be one
argumentative frame of reference ahead of the magistrate much of the time.
These arguments were influential for several reasons. Almost invariably, they were
based on entitlement claims more than power or leverage (e.g., that Drillco should pay because it
would be cheaper to settle than to litigate),265 and thus avoided the antagonism that goes with
telling someone he must do what you say because you will punish him if he does not. The
lawyers also were careful not to resort to name-calling, ridicule and other types of ad hominem
tactics (e.g., describing the magistrate’s responses as silly, ridiculous, or the like), popular with
lawyers when listeners do not agree. They were unfailingly courteous and respectful, channeling
expressions of intensity and commitment into tone and demeanor more than language. They
gave the magistrate room to respond to their arguments, listened without interruption when he
did, and countered his points with substantive rejoinders, never dismissing them out of hand or
ridiculing them as not worthy of a response. They did not use long soliloquies to filibuster points
that were difficult for them, or otherwise try to prevent the magistrate from challenging their
views, nor did they deny weak points in their arguments by refusing to talk about them altogether
(though, in fairness, they also did not dwell on such points and tried to shift discussion away
from them as quickly as possible). They exhibited none of the defensiveness typically associated
with lawyers who are bluffing or posturing.
Perhaps the lawyers’ most powerful attribute, however, was their tenaciousness or ability
to persist in the face the magistrate’s seemingly sincere dismissal of their arguments and
rejection of their demands. 266 More than once they refused to take no for an answer when the
magistrate seemingly rejected an argument out of hand. They assumed that the magistrate did
265

While the Paine lawyers’ entitlement claims were suspect, the fact that they were entitlement claims
made it more difficult for the magistrate to be offended by them, or dismiss them as not worthy of serious
consideration. The categories of entitlement and power break down at the margin, of course. Every well-reasoned
argument draws on psychological leverage for its force as much as on principles of logic and evidence. A listener
who cannot rebut a point often will concede it, for example, not solely because he believes the point to be true but
also because he does not want to take the chance of being embarrassed by a discussion of it that makes his ignorance
clear for all to see. See Condlin, supra note 7, at 69-79, for a discussion of the different characteristics of different
advocacy strategies and the risks in using each type. Threat-based bargaining, on the other hand, is one-dimensional
and unambiguously offensive.
266
This quality was particularly helpful to the lawyers’ novel but weak arguments. When the magistrate
dismissed these arguments peremptorily the lawyers continued to assert them in different forms rather than abandon
them as one might have expected. When the magistrate did not continue to rebut with the same insistence the
arguments began to look stronger, since even weak arguments can look good if unrebutted. Even if the arguments
did not convince, the fact that the Paine lawyers continued to assert them made the lawyers’ protestations appear to
be sincere and this meant that when the lawyers eventually abandoned the argument they would have to be given
something in return, since they were giving up something that, for all outward appearances, was real.
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not understand and pressed their points again and again, sometimes in as many as five distinct
versions, until they either convinced him that the points had merit, weakened his conviction to
the contrary, increased his perception of the costs of beating back their claims, or exhausted
him.267 Equally important, they accompanied this argumentative persistence with signals of
open-mindedness and willingness to compromise that helped ameliorate the impression that they
were just being intransigent or stubborn. They kept the magistrate dangling on the end of a line,
in a sense, just short of the point where it would seem hopeless to continue the discussion and
avoided conceding points until it was absolutely necessary to do so.268 In short, through a
combination of substantive cleverness and forceful yet flexible demeanor they managed to be
confident without being arrogant, articulate without being glib and assertive without being
belligerent. They made it seem as if their case did not depend upon rhetorical tricks and as if
they were motivated by a commitment to client interests more than a desire to win. While their
relentless combativeness sometimes was annoying, it was a substantive kind of combativeness,
expressed in what was said rather than in how it was said and substantive combativeness is hard
to fault, at least on reflection, because it is just another form of sticking up for oneself.269
The Paine lawyers’ strategies had some of the outward features of communitarian
bargaining but the lawyers themselves were not problem-solvers in any ordinary sense of the
term. They were unfailingly polite and respectful, for sure, in a manner Williams would have
approved and argued from principle rather than power in the manner advised by Fisher and Ury,
but they also treated the conference as an exercise in self-interested maximizing. They were
deceptive, competitive, concerned almost exclusively with Paine’s interests and intent on coming
away from the conference with as much as they could get (and more than Drillco), more than
finding a mutually beneficial middle-ground solution. They were willing to exploit all of the
leverage available to them, including personal qualities of the magistrate unrelated to the
267

The Drillco lawyer also seemed to get tired and made several mistakes because of it. Tiredness is a
structural feature of bargaining, however, and something effective bargainers exploit, whether consciously or not. In
fact, some bargaining strategies are designed to produce tiredness.
268
The lawyers were so good at this process of adversarial conversation that at times the magistrate even
finished their arguments for them, convincing himself of what they had to say. See discussion supra p. 203 and
accompanying text.
269
As one might expect, the Paine lawyers’ behavior often produces strong reactions in those who watch
the tape of the conference, and many describe the lawyers’ behavior in unflattering terms but this is a mistake. The
lawyers were not mean-spirited or obnoxious, all or even part of the time; they were just substantively aggressive.
They were not “sharpies” in Scott Peppet’s caricatured re-deployment of William Simon’s quaint term. See Peppet,
supra note 8, at 481-84. They were hard but fair bargainers, forceful but not overbearing, the kind of bargainers one
would hire to protect important interests one didn’t want compromised. Theirs was a kind of “on the merits”
aggressiveness, not one of personal force, an aggressiveness motivated by a sense of integrity and loyalty to the
client more than a sadistic desire to beat someone up or a megalomaniacal need to aggrandize oneself at the expense
of another. See Roger Fisher and Wayne H. Davis, Six Basic Interpersonal Skills for a Negotiator’s Repertoire, 3
NEGOT. J. 117, 120 (1987) (describing the skill of “Being Assertive Without Damaging the [Bargaining]
Relationship”). Their claims appeared reasonable at the time (or the magistrate would not have given in to them),
and it was only in retrospect that some of the things they said seemed excessive. Lawyers don’t like bargaining with
such people, but they also don’t dismiss them as unreasonable or hold grudges against them after negotiations are
over either. Only mean-spirited strategies, those based on personal attack and those intended to threaten rather than
persuade, leave lingering grievances. There is a fine line between being substantively aggressive and mean-spirited,
of course, and many lawyers fail to walk it successfully, usually because their attitudes (rather than motor skills) are
all wrong. But being able to walk this line, as the Paine lawyers did, not avoiding it altogether, is the hallmark of
skillful bargaining.
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substantive issues in the dispute, if that’s what it took to produce this result. 270 They rejected
strategic options on grounds of ineffectiveness but only infrequently on grounds of sociability.
Beneath their outward appearance of reasoned elaboration lay an unvarnished desire to win and
this took them outside the camp of communitarian bargaining.
The Paine lawyers’ decision to bargain in this way is easy to understand. If it is possible
to win more than an adversary, without compromising one’s integrity, abusing others, corrupting
legal institutions, or making the world a more hostile place – and the Paine lawyers’ behavior is
evidence that it is – then it is only rational to try to do this, even if the behavior involved is not
saintly (i.e., selfless).271 One is usually better off with more rather than less of something valued,
everything else being equal – that someone felt otherwise would be the breaking news.
Moreover, bargaining in this way permits lawyers to honor promises to clients, perform at a high
level of technical proficiency,272 advertise themselves and prosper, all at the same time. These
are attractive effects, both in themselves and for the distinctiveness they can confer in the
sometimes depressing anonymity of modern professional life.273 Clients will go down this path
with lawyers because they will believe that doing so increases their chances of getting out-of-theordinary compensation for their claims and only rare clients will think their claims are not worth
out-of-the-ordinary compensation.
Bargaining in this manner even benefits the system of informal dispute settlement itself
in the sense that it encourages lawyers to base agreements on the outcomes of arguments over
270

The “age discrimination analogy” argument, for example, owed its success as much to the fact that it
surprised the magistrate and caused him to back away from discussing it to avoid the embarrassment as it did to the
fact that it was intrinsically convincing.
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On the role of saintliness in negotiation, see Scott R. Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate? A Brief Introduction
to the Problems of Perfect Ethics in Bargaining, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 83 (2002). The emphasis here should be
on the “possibility” of winning more than the adversary since in any given case most lawyers will not be as
successful as the Paine lawyers were here. Some will, however, and all might, so it is not surprising that individual
lawyers regularly would indulge in the assumption that they could win big by playing out a facsimile of the Paine
lawyers’ strategy, expecting to revert to communitarian methods if a more competitive approach did not work.
Some argue that bargainers can never go home again, that relationships once defined as competitive cannot be
reformed as cooperative, but that will depend, as do almost all interactional issues, on what form the competitive
behavior takes. Compare Morris, supra note 101, at (describing how bargainers commonly turn away from a fully
cooperative tone toward more contentious tactics at the endgame stage of negotiation). Bargainers who are meanspirited and nasty will not be able to revert convincingly to warm and cuddly social styles, but bargainers who are
only assertive and forceful will be able to revert to cooperative ones. There is a principled inconsistency between
the first two approaches that is missing between the second two.
272
Building on the Aristotelian view that “a good life has the inherent value of a skillful performance,”
Ronald Dworkin argues that “living a life is itself a performance that demands skill, that it is the most
comprehensive and important challenge we face, and that our critical interests consist in the achievements, events,
and experiences that mean that we have met the challenge well.” RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 253 (2000) (emphasis omitted).
273
See THE MARYLAND JUDICIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONALISM: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 41
(Hon. Lynne A. Battaglia, Chairperson, & Norman L. Smith, Reporter, November 10, 2003) (describing how “all
participants [in the study] expressed [a concern for ] the lack of recognition of [their] accomplishment[s]”). The
drive to achieve practice skill distinction can be seen as a response to the “quiet desperation” problem. See HENRY
DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN, at ch. 1-A, ¶ 9 (Everyman’s Library 1993) (1854) (“The mass of men lead lives of quiet
desperation.”). The development of the communitarian conception of bargaining itself might even be explained in
this way, as an instance of legal academics searching for a theoretically distinctive niche in a world where all of the
(overtly) adversarial variations are taken.
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entitlement claims and this in turn makes these agreements more substantively legitimate. Legal
dispute settlement must be normative as well as instrumental, legitimate as well as final. The
legal system promises this and parties caught up in the system are entitled to it. Legal rights
should mean the same thing however and wherever vindicated, whether a boardroom or a
courtroom. As I argued several years ago:
[Persons who] use the legal system . . . are entitled to presume that their disputes
will be resolved according to law. They may choose to waive this entitlement for
non-legal considerations such as fear of publicity, an immediate need for cash,
personal feelings for the adversary, intolerance for conflict, moral sensibilities,
and the like, and this decision is not troublesome if it represents the free choice of
one value over another, when both choices are known. But the selection of a
negotiated outcome over an adjudicated one, by itself, should not be seen as a
waiver of this entitlement.274
In a reasonably just legal system, therefore, “the justice of negotiated outcomes exists, at a
minimum, to the extent the parties’ competing legal claims are competently raised, debated and
resolved.”275
Argument over legal rights of the sort prominent in the Drillco conference is one of the
principal ways normative factors make their way into informal dispute settlement. Legal
argument improves the legitimacy of bargained-for agreements by resolving the substantive
conflicts at the base of most dispute-negotiation, and if conducted in the manner of the Drillco
conference, does so without rupturing relationships or sending conversations off-track. A failure
to resolve such conflicts subordinates the client interest in legitimate outcomes for the lawyer
interest in cordial and predictable social relations, and often results in resentment, anger and a
refusal to accept settlements as legitimate. Argument can produce conflict, of course, sometimes
more readily than splitting differences or looking for shared interests, but conflict is not one of
the circles of hell. It results in learning and growth as much as impasse and helps separate
important considerations from unimportant ones in determining where to settle. The excesses of
belligerence, rudeness and mean-spiritedness must be avoided, of course, but arguing over
differences, even robustly, is a major part of what principled life is all about.
Communitarian bargaining theory seems to assume that lawyers and clients will put aside
concerns of individual entitlement and systemic legitimacy for what are principally aesthetic
reasons,276 but it is not clear why they would, or what evidence suggests that they ever have.
Perhaps in an Hegelian spirit world, or one of Platonic forms, there would be no tendency to
prefer one’s own projects (though it is not clear why they would then be one’s own projects) or
to do the right thing, but bargaining does not operate (in fact, it wouldn’t be needed so far as one
can tell) in a spirit world. The desire to do as well as possible is as much a feature of legal
bargaining as it is of social life generally and as such, it is a feature that any viable theory of
bargaining must recognize and take into account.277
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Condlin, supra note 7, at 81-82. See also Wetlaufer, supra note 43 (discussing the role of substantive
argument in bargaining).
275
Condlin, supra note 7, at 83.
276
Peppet, supra note 8, at 516, 531 (describing the motives behind communitarian bargaining reforms).
277
One might say that communitarian bargaining theorists do not deal adequately with (in a sense, do not
acknowledge) the Pogo problem. See WALT KELLY, WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US (1987). For the
history of the expression, see I Go Pogo, http://www.igopogo.com/we_have_met.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
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The lessons of the Drillco pre-trial conference will not startle practicing lawyers. They
understand, for example, that surprising adversaries with unusual, unexpected, or clever
arguments has strategic value. Lawyers do not like to be told things about cases (particularly in
public) they think they should have thought of themselves and they are embarrassed when this
happens. This embarrassment can take them temporarily off their game, so to speak and put
them on the defensive. They would like to consider the new information carefully and in private
before responding, but often they cannot. Time is pressing, others are waiting for answers,
meetings need to be concluded and, as a practical matter, it is not possible to break off
conversation to do more preparation every time something one has missed comes up. If lawyers
cannot process new arguments in public and in real time, however, often they will defer to them
(in the way that the loser of a contest defers to the winner),278 and make concessions based on
this deference. This option will be available to some extent in all negotiation since it is possible
to surprise all lawyers, even experienced ones, with new arguments some of the time.279 These
They operate on an unsophisticated, if not naïve, psychology that sees self-interested competition over scarce and
valuable resources as an optional feature of social and political life. They should read more Madison, THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“If men were angels, no government would be necessary.”), or De Waal.
FRANS DE WAAL, PEACEMAKING AMONG PRIMATES 269-71 (1989) (describing how “human societies are structured
by the interplay between antagonism and attraction [and how the] disappearance of the former is more than an
unrealistic wish, it is a misguided one. . . Aggression . . . cannot be fully understood without taking the biological
component into account . . . [The] countermeasures [of forgiveness and reconciliation also] evolved along with
aggressive behavior . . . [and] are a shared heritage of the primate order.”). Richard Nisbett’s remarkable book on
the “geography of thought” shows how an individualistic and competitive view of bargaining has its greatest
explanatory power for American (or Western) bargaining practice. See RICHARD NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF
THOUGHT: HOW ASIANS AND WESTERNERS THINK DIFFERENTLY . . . AND WHY 73-77 (2003). Summarizing
decades of social science research, much of which he conducted himself, Nisbett shows how an individualistic focus
on particular events in isolation from their context and a belief that one can know the rules governing such events
and control the way the events unfold is a characteristic of Western culture. See also Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation
and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L. J. 29, 43-48 (1982) (describing this view as the American lawyer’s “standard
philosophical map”). He contrasts this way of thinking with a broad, contextual view characteristic of Asian culture
that sees events as highly complex and determined by interdependent factors requiring joint action. Cultural
institutions are not fungible, however, and the fact that bargainers somewhere in the world could negotiate in a
communitarian fashion is not evidence that American legal bargainers can as well. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE 93-103 (1983) (describing the cultural barriers to transferring features of German dispute settlement to
the American legal system). It is possible, of course, that Francis Fukuyama is correct (and Samuel Huntington
wrong) when he claims that world economic and political systems are converging on the Western democratic and
capitalist model. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1993); but see SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1998). (Fukuyama recently
seems to have backed away somewhat from this Hegelian vision. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, AMERICA AT THE
CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY, POWER AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVE LEGACY (2006).) If this is true, and economic
and political systems are converging in this way, then psychological and cultural characteristics of peoples will not
be far behind and the adversarial bargaining model will be everyone’s preferred approach. It also is possible,
however, that this convergence will be on a hybrid set of characteristics taken from both Eastern and Western
cultures. See NISBETT, supra, at 225-29.
278
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arguments need not be true to work. It is enough that they are too difficult to see through on
short notice and give listeners doubts they did not have coming into the negotiation and doubt is
leverage in negotiation. But surprise argument also can be an instrument of manipulation and
deception and, like the Paine lawyers’ age discrimination argument, can be used to convince a
bargainer to concede a point he or she does not need to. Communitarians disapprove of such
argument for much the same reason practicing lawyers embrace it: it often works.
Similarly, lawyers know that it is sometimes possible to take advantage of a bargainer’s
state of mind or personal psychological characteristics unrelated to the substantive issues in the
dispute. For example, many law-trained people are not comfortable with conflict. This may
seem counter intuitive given the nature of legal work but disagreement in law is often stylized or
theatrical precisely because lawyers find it too uncomfortable to deal with as real. When they
are uncomfortable, however, just as when they are surprised, lawyers become careless and make
mistakes. They concede points they don’t have to and make more generous offers than they need
to. Often, therefore, there is leverage in creating, exaggerating and dragging out disagreements
as long as one’s tolerance for conflict exceeds that of the other bargainer. All successful
bargainers know and act on this insight some of the time, changing negotiation outcomes at the
margin by the one or two items needed to make a good deal an excellent one. But exploiting
bargainer attitudes and personal psychological characteristics unrelated to the substantive issues
in dispute also is not a communitarian move.
Finally, lawyers know that adversaries can be unprepared for negotiation, lack experience
with the issues or procedures involved in a case, or not like the clients or positions they have
been asked to defend. Successful bargainers notice these attitudes when they are present and
exploit them. The Drillco lawyer, for example, was a highly skilled and experienced negotiator
but he lacked the Paine lawyers’ enthusiasm for the task at hand (as did the magistrate), and the
Paine lawyers used this lack of commitment to their advantage. Their success, in part, was an
illustration of the familiar sports maxim that whoever “wants it more,” often gets it. These and
other such strategies work just as well against problem-solving bargainers as competitive ones,
perhaps even better. In using such strategies bargainers must keep their true purposes hidden, of
course, but this usually can be done by avoiding rudeness and belligerence and by supporting
demands with reasons and arguments. A bargaining approach is known best by its definition of
success (maximize, split the difference, or satisfice), however, not its social style or tactical
choices and the Paine lawyers’ behavior is a case study in bargaining competitively without
appearing to.
Conclusion
The last half of the twentieth century saw a series of withering and unrelenting criticisms
of both the institutions and practices of the American adversary system.280 Philosophers objected
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to the system’s crude empirical assumptions (about finding truth),281 its armchair psychologizing
(about motivating lawyers and preventing decision-maker bias),282 and its propensity to
dehumanize lawyer social relations.283 Judges criticized it for its tendency to “beat every
plowshare into a sword,”284 and legal academics found it inefficient, error-prone and wasteful in
comparison with civil law and inquisitorial alternatives.285 Cultural critics also weighed in,
suggesting that lawyer adversary behavior was a retrograde social phenomenon responsible for
the decline in American civility and productivity generally.286 With such an across the board
consensus that lawyers and legal institutions had become too antagonistic and antagonizing it
was only a matter of time before a more caring and nurturing pretender to the dispute settlement
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throne would emerge. That pretender, now known by the collective rubric of alternative dispute
resolution, or ADR,287 has become a many-headed monster of its own, with manifestations in all
aspects of legal and social life, but the area in which it has had perhaps the greatest influence is
in the academic scholarship on legal bargaining.288
Not surprisingly, ADR scholarship began as a literature of criticism, concerned more with
pointing out the faults of the adversarial model than with describing alternatives to it.289 But
because evolution is as much a background feature of legal bargaining theory as it is of
biological life, these early criticisms soon began to be expressed in more positive terms, first as
tactics and strategies for making adversarial practices more cordial,290 and then as a complete
makeover for adversarial bargaining generally.291 Like most intellectual movements that are
clearer about what they oppose than what they embrace, however, ADR bargaining scholarship
overdid things a little, rejecting all types of self-interested maneuvering rather than just its meanspirited and asocial forms. Rather than tweak adversarial methods to eliminate the gratuitous
belligerence, rudeness and nastiness that had crept in, the early ADR literature attempted to
eliminate aggressive, self-interested maneuvering from bargaining practice entirely.
Unfortunately, it became trapped in this oppositional stance, unable to avoid defining itself
mostly in terms of what it was not – perhaps to make it clear that it was different – or to
acknowledge that there was anything good about the approach it sought to replace.292
It is more than a little ironic that a communitarian perspective on bargaining would come
to view the world in such either-or (one might even say competitive) terms. The reflexive
tendency to dichotomize was one of communitarian theory’s principal objections to adversarial
bargaining. Communitarian bargainers were supposed to reject bipolar conceptions of options,
see connections where others saw divisions and synthesize hybrid resolutions out of stand-alone
alternatives.293 It was not thought very communitarian, in other words, to see the world as “us”
versus “them,” but that seems to be what has happened in communitarian theory’s attempt to
separate itself from the world of adversary advocacy. Obviously, this will not do. To be taken
seriously by lawyers and ultimately even by academics, communitarian bargaining theory must
make room for and incorporate the sort of adversarial maneuvering the Paine lawyers used so
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effectively in the Drillco pre-trial conference. It must explain how deception,294 aggressive
argument and self-interested trading fit within a complete conception of bargaining behavior and
concern itself more with the issue of how to keep such maneuvering in check than with how to
eliminate it altogether. All bargaining, even its communitarian form, is a lying game to some
extent,295 and one in which adversarial behavior plays an inevitable role. To pretend otherwise is
to deny reality, actual and imagined. It is a little like trying to convince a runner not to drink
before a road race on the theory that a dehydrated person can run as far as hydrated one and will
be able to do so faster because he does not have to carry all that extra fluid. Advice of this sort
always will be a bystander in the world of real life bargaining (and running).
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